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modern economics, these Jewish laws, like all attempts at price-fixing, are shown to be self-defeating; the means 
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Keywords: price controls; price fixing; just price; jewish business ethics; religious economics
JEL Codes: A12, B11, D00, K20, P00, Z12
Louis Ginzberg once joked (1920: 97) that
The devil, according to Shakespeare, quotes Scripture. But if he is really as clever as he is 
reputed to be, he ought to quote Talmud, as there is hardly any view of life for and against which 
one could not quote the Talmud.
In particular, much ink has been spilled debating whether a given religion – say Judaism or Christianity – would 
favor this or that socio-economic system – for example, capitalism or socialism. One mainstream view argues 
that Judaism is generally in favor of private property, markets, and differential prices and wages. If so, Judaism 
is basically in favor of capitalism (e.g. Sauer and Sauer 2012; Lifshitz 2012; Paley 2006; Hill 1995: 373f.; 
Block, Brennan, and Elzinga 1985: 401-459 passim; Block and Hexham 1986: 375-461 passim; Tamari 1986, 
1987, 1991, 2010).2
However, even if one concedes that Judaism is in favor of capitalism, such a characterization, no matter 
how accurate, is nevertheless extremely vague. For depending on the interpreter, “capitalism” can run anywhere 
from a highly interventionist corporatism (fascism) or a social-democracy (mixed economy), all the way to 
complete laissez-faire. In turn, laissez-faire capitalism could embrace not only Lockean or Nozickean minimal 
night-watchman government (minarchism) but even Gustave de Molinari's market-anarchism (anarcho-
capitalism). So the statement that Judaism is in favor of capitalism really does not say very much. Aaron Levine 
(1985a, b; 2012) and Meir Tamari (1986, 1987, 1991, 2010) in particular argue that while Judaism would on the 
balance favor capitalism, it (Judaism) would nevertheless insist on several crucial checks and limitations on free-
trade for the sake of justice, fairness, and the public good.
In order to accurately assess which socio-economic system Judaism would prefer, one must 
painstakingly analyze each and every individual Jewish law (halakhah) in detail.3 This present article aims to do 
precisely this with regard to one specific set of halakhot (pl.), namely ona'ah – the prohibition of charging unfair 
prices – and hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh– price-controls imposed on foodstuffs. These laws are chosen 
specifically because of all Jewish laws, they are perhaps the most apparently contrary to the operation to a free-
market.4 We will show that the laws of ona'ah and/or hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh5 may in fact institute 
price-controls, perhaps somewhat similar to the famous Medieval “just price” legislation (Kleiman 1987: 23, 39-
44; David Friedman in Block, Brennan, and Elzinga 1985: 453).6 With respect to this set of laws, Judaism may 
have to be judged as opposed to rather than in favor of capitalism. Furthermore, we will show that in the light of 
modern economic theory, if the law of ona'ah constitutes price-control, then it, like all forms of price-control, 
would be inefficient and self-defeating, accomplishing the opposite of its intention (Coyne and Coyne 2015a, 
Schuettinger and Butler 1979, Morton 2001, Rockoff 2008, Levine 2012: 94).
If enforcement of ona'ah and/or hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh price-controls turns out to be 
economically inefficient, an obvious dilemma arises for the Orthodox or traditionally observant Jew: what to do 
when science and religion apparently conflict? It is conventional to accept the possibility of conflict between 
religion and cosmology and biology (evolution),7 but it is not usually realized that a similar conflict can exist 
between religion and economic science. There is an important difference between the normative value judgments 
which any religion is entitled to make (such as that fairness ought to prevail over economic efficiency) versus 
positive-economic statements of strict causality, such as “rent control reduces the supply of rental housing” 
which, if true, no religion may deny. Applying the positive-normative distinction to religion, Walter E. Block has 
argued (1986: 451) that
if it can be shown that the precepts of some religion run counter to these factual statements 
[concerning economics], that is too bad for that particular religion. It is as if this religion is on 
record denying that the earth is round, or that water is composed of two parts hydrogen and one 
part oxygen.
Thus, religion and science may conflict not only in matters of cosmology and biology but also economics. 
Assuming it is true that rent-control reduces the supply of housing, any religion is perfectly entitled to argue that 
it prefers to promote “fair” lower housing prices even at the cost of reducing the supply of housing, for this is a 
normative judgment. This religion would accept the positive findings of science but interpret their normative 
significance and implications differently. What the religion may not legitimately do, however, is declare that it 
aims at promoting the ready availability of housing through the imposition of rent-controls. In this case, the 
religion is not merely disagreeing on the moral significance of given scientific fact, but it is denying scientific 
fact itself. To quote Murray N. Rothbard (1970: 4, rpt. in Rothbard 2000 [1974]: 202),
It is no crime to be ignorant of economics, which is, after all, a specialized discipline and one 
that most people consider to be a “dismal science.” But it is totally irresponsible to have a loud 
and vociferous opinion on economic subjects while remaining in this state of ignorance.
One is not obliged to accept the normative assumption that ready supply of housing is a good thing, and 
therefore, one is not obligated to oppose rent-control. But that rent-control reduces the supply of housing is a 
scientific fact which cannot be denied without appropriate scientific proof. The religion may legitimately deny 
the positive scientific fact if and only if the rejection is accompanied by scientific proof. Whereas in normative 
matters of subjective judgment and ethical taste, no proof is strictly necessary (de gustibus non est disputandum). 
One is not obligated to scientifically prove the normative assertion that low housing prices are preferable to 
ready availability of housing, but one is obligated to prove the positive-scientific claim that rent-control does not 
reduce the supply of housing. Likewise, it requires scientific evidence to refute the positive-scientific claim that 
artificially low prices and ready supply of housing cannot be obtained simultaneously. 
There is already an abundant literature on how a religion may or should deal with conflicts between 
religious belief and scientific facts concerning cosmology and biology. We will propose that such conflicts in 
matters of the economy should be dealt with in approximately the same manner as conflicts between science and 
the first chapter of Genesis. According to the traditional Jewish literature, it is possible to distinguish that which 
was received at Sinai from that which was determined by the Talmudic rabbis based on their own independent 
study of science. Therefore, one may alter the halakhah (Jewish law) according to new discoveries of scientific 
fact without abandoning the essential “revealed” religious core of the law. The conclusion of this article will 
therefore be, in some ways, compatible with studies concerning ethical philosophers who wrongly presumed 
certain scientific facts which have later turned out to be inaccurate. These studies have attempted to demonstrate 
that the essential core of the ethical theory may survive even if the presumed scientific “facts” are suitably 
replaced. For example, Fred J. Miller (2013) has argued that while Aristotle himself had a negative attitude 
towards the morality of business, that this was because Aristotle lacked modern economic theory. Miller argues 
that one may replace Aristotle's own notions of economics with modern theory, while yet retaining unaltered the 
essence of Aristotelian virtue ethics (eudaimonism). Thus, Miller claims (2013), one may morally justify 
business activity using only a slightly modified Aristotelian ethical framework, wherein only the scientific facts 
of economics presumed by Aristotle are abandoned, while the essential core of Aristotelian ethics is left 
unchanged. This article will attempt to do something very similar, namely to demonstrate that the Talmud 
presumed certain scientific theories in its legislation, but that these scientific theories are not religiously 
authoritative, and that one may dispense with the Talmud's scientific assumptions – including those concerning 
economics – without rejecting the essential ethical, legal, or revealed-religious framework of the Talmud.
It is crucial to note that we will be analyzing Jewish law as a single, continuous whole, considering the 
Roman-era Mishnah, the Sassanid-era Talmud, and the Medieval codes of Jewish law as explaining each other. 
In other words, we are interested in what living Jewish law has to say for practical matters, rather than being 
concerned with what the historical Mishnah or Talmud meant. There is an important distinction to be drawn 
between the two approaches: on the one hand, one could isolate specific statements in the Mishnah or Talmud 
and situate them in their historical contexts according to the identities of their named-authors. On the other hand, 
one may consider Jewish literature as a continuous unity and study it in a relatively ahistorical fashion. Ephraim 
Kleiman's study of ona'ah (1987) takes the historical approach and notes that other scholars have taken the unity 
approach (Kleiman 1987: 25 n. 2). This present article will take the unity approach, for our concern is not with 
what the specific authors of the Mishnah or Talmud meant as individuals, but instead with how living, evolving 
Jewish law has understood them.
Thus, this article will analyze what may be the most anti-market legislation in Judaism, viz. ona'ah and 
hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh, and judge just how anti-market those laws actually are. If these laws constitute 
price-controls, then this is an extremely strong argument that Judaism may not reconcilable with capitalism. On 
the other hand, if these laws are not forms of price-control, then this will strengthen the case that Judaism may 
be in favor of capitalism. Alternately, if these laws are forms of price-control but if there are easy means of 
circumventing or negating them, then once again, this will contribute to the argument that Judaism is – or can be 
– in favor of capitalism.
Aside from this article's contribution to a subject of parochially religious-Jewish interest, it will have 
ramifications that will be of interest to gentiles and academic scholars in three different ways: first, that it is not 
enough to merely say that a given religion is in favor of capitalism in general; one must qualify this 
generalization by studying specific laws. Second, that conflicts between religion and science are not limited to 
cosmology and biology, but may include economics as well. Where religion conflicts with modern economic 
science, one should treat this like any other conflict between science and religion rather than simply ignoring the 
conflict as if it does not exist. Third, that it is sometimes possible to distinguish between the essential core of an 
ethical theory on the one hand and any scientific facts presumed true by the ethical theorist on the other hand. 
When the scientific “facts” turn out to be false, it is not necessarily the case that one must abandon that ethical 
theory in toto. One may be able to preserve the essence of the ethical theory while discarding the false scientific 
“facts” which had been a merely secondary or tertiary part of the ethical theory.
This paper is organized as follows: section I summarizes the laws of ona'ah and hafka'at she'arim / 
hayyei nefesh, to establish the basic characteristics of these laws but without subjecting them to any critical 
analysis. Section II evaluates ona'ah to determine its purpose and intention and to judge whether it constitutes a 
price-control or not. Section III does the same for hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh. We shall find that ona'ah is 
not a price-control but that hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh is one. Section IV evaluates price-controls in 
general according to contemporary economic theory, demonstrating the significance of the finding that hafka'at 
she'arim / hayyei nefesh is a price-control. Section V discusses a few sundry matters tangentially related to 
ona'ah, including rent-controls, minimum wages, and how ona'ah has influenced Israeli law. Section VI 
discusses halakhic (Jewish legal) restrictions on middlemen and speculators, showing that these restrictions are 
damaging as well, similarly to price-controls. Section VII is a philosophical discussion of what it means for 
price-controls and other economic regulations to be self-defeating, and in particular, how the halakhic economic 
regulations previously discussed defeat the specific Jewish ethical goals they are meant to accomplish. Section 
VIII criticizes one author's attempt to rehabilitate hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh and demonstrate that it is not 
a price-control. This paper argues that that author's attempt must be judged unsuccessful, and that hafka'at 
she'arim / hayyei nefesh really is a price-control after all. Section IX investigates whether these Jewish laws are 
still in force today, whether they still possess any binding authority. This section concludes that some of these 
laws lie in desuetude, but that others are still problematically authoritative. Section X discusses whether the 
halakhah can be altered according to new scientific discoveries. Section XI uses the conclusion of the previous 
section - that the halakhah can indeed be altered to fit new scientific discoveries - to argue that the halakhic 
economic regulations ought to be altered or annulled according to the discoveries of modern economic science. 
Section XII concludes.
I. The Laws of Ona'ah and Hafka'at She'arim / Hayyei Nefesh Summarized
First, we must explore the history of Talmudic price-regulation in general, especially ona'ah and hafka'at  
she'arim / hayyei nefesh.8 Menachem Elon summarizes the general history of Talmudic price-legislation as 
follows (Elon 2008):9
It would seem that in the mishnaic period there were fixed prices, apparently determined by a 
competent authority (BM [Bava Metzia] 4:12, 5:7). There is evidence that in Jerusalem – prior to 
the destruction of the Temple – the market commissioners “did not supervise prices but [weights 
and] measures only” (Tosef. [Tosefta], BM 6:14); in Babylonia (at the commencement of the 
third century C.E.) there was supervision of prices at the instigation of the exilarch (TJ 
[Palestinian Talmud], BB [Bava Batra] 5:11, 15a; TB [Babylonian Talmud], BB 89a). The sages 
of that period were divided, however, on this matter. Some expressed the opinion that “price 
inspectors do not need to be appointed” and that competition between merchants would suffice 
to stabilize the price while others were of the opinion that it was incumbent on the court to 
supervise the prices because of the “swindlers” who hoarded commodities toward a time when 
they might be in short supply in order to sell them at a high price (TJ and TB, BB 89a). Over the 
course of time the view favoring price supervision apparently became generally accepted (BB 
89a; Yoma 9a) and thus it was decided in the codes: “But the court is obliged to determine prices 
and to appoint commissioners for this purpose, to prevent everyone from charging what he likes 
…” ([Maimonides] Yad [i.e. Mishneh Torah], [Hilkhot] Mekhirah 14:1; Tur and Sh. Ar. [Shulhan 
Arukh], HM [Hoshen Mishpat] 231:20).
Notice some were of the opinion that “competition between merchants would suffice” (cf. Tamari 1987: 94), but 
that this opinion was eventually rejected by the Rabbinic consensus until “the view favoring price supervision 
apparently became generally accepted” in order to regulate prices and “to prevent everyone from charging what 
he likes.” Furthermore, that additional opprobrium and concern was directed at speculators, the “'swindlers' who 
hoarded commodities toward a time when they might be in short supply in order to sell them at a high price.” 
Shmuel Shilo defines ona'ah in particular as “the act of wronging another by selling him an article for 
more than its real worth or by purchasing from him an article for less than its real worth” (Shilo and Elon 
2008).10 Ephraim Kleiman defines ona'ah as “exploitation through price deceit” (Kleiman 1987: 25).11 Ona'ah is 
based on an interpretation of the verse in Leviticus 25:14, “And if thou sell aught unto thy neighbor, or buy of 
thy neighbor's hand, ye shall not wrong (tonu) one another” (Hil. Mekhira 12:1; Shilo and Elon 2008; Kleiman 
1987: 25). There are three different degrees of prohibited ona'ah.12 First is where the discrepancy between the 
sale price and the official market price is more than one-sixth, whether above or below, i.e. whether over- or 
under-charging.13 In this case, the sale is null-and-void. Secondly, where the sale and market price differ by 
exactly this amount, in which case the transaction is binding but the victim is entitled to restitution of the full 
amount of the ona 'ah, i.e. the amount of the prohibited one-sixth discrepancy. The third case is where there is 
less than a one-sixth discrepancy between sale and official market price; here, the sale is binding, and the injured 
party has no claim to compensation. There is a dispute among the Jewish authorities whether a discrepancy less 
than one-sixth is permitted or whether it is forbidden but non-actionable (Levine 2012: 54f.).
Meanwhile, closely related to ona'ah is another law, that banning hafka'at she'arim or “profiteering” – 
also known as the law ensuring access to food essential for the sustenance of hayyei nefesh or “life of the soul.”14 
Menachem Elon defines hafka'at she'arim (profiteering) as “raising the price of a commodity beyond the 
accepted level, or that fixed by a competent authority” (Elon 2008). Similarly, Itamar Warhaftig says (1987: sec. 
“1”) that “a profiteer is one who causes the prices to rise in an artificial manner” and that the halakhah restricted 
“someone who causes prices to rise without economic justification.” 
Whereas ona'ah is a Biblical prohibition which may be waived in certain cases by the parties involved, 
hafka'at she'arim is a Rabbinic enactment reinforcing the prohibition of ona'ah by forbidding the parties from 
voluntarily waiving ona'ah in certain situations (Elon 2008).15 16 Furthermore, whereas ona'ah applies to nearly 
all goods and commodities whatsoever – with but a few exceptions, specifically real estate, slaves, bills, and 
consecrated objects (Hil. Mekhira 13:8-18, Kleiman 1987: 30, Shilo and Elon 2008, Warhaftig 1988: sec. “C. 
Exceptions”, Lew 1995: 43, Tamari 1991: 76)17 – by contrast, hafka'at she'arim applies only to essential 
foodstuffs (Hil. Mekhira 14:1-2, quoted in Tamari 1991: 77; Elon 2008; Tamari 1987: 88).18 To summarize: 
ona'ah is a Biblical prohibition which prohibits certain degrees of over- or under-charging on all commodities 
except real estate, slaves, bill, and consecrated objects, but the parties to the transaction may waive the 
prohibition if there is mutual consent. Hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh, by contrast, is a Rabbinic prohibition 
similar prohibiting over- or under-charging, but only for foodstuffs, and this prohibition cannot be waived, not 
even by the mutual consent of the parties.
Notice that the restrictions on permissible price seem to be with respect to a fixed, official price, not with 
respect to the costs incurred in production or acquisition. This is the view of Maimonides, and while it is the 
most prominent view, relied on by most authorities, there is another view. According to the Rashbam, one is 
prohibited to make a profit of more than one-sixth with respect to the costs he has incurred.19 According to this 
second view that ona'ah is cost-based, ona'ah is not a form of direct price-control, but rather it is a form of 
profit-limitation, aimed especially against middlemen.20 However, many of the same sorts of objections to price-
controls would apply to both interpretations of ona'ah, for if ona'ah turns out to constitute a price-control, then 
these two interpretations would merely have the mandated price be calculated on a different basis. Whether one 
restricts prices based on an officially fixed permissible sale price or whether based on costs of production and 
acquisition, either way, the result is a form of price-control. The question we will investigate is whether ona'ah is 
indeed a price-control at all.
Returning to the view of Maimonides that ona'ah is calculated based on some official price, it is not 
entirely clear, however, whether the fixed price is to be set arbitrarily, or whether it is supposed to bear some 
relation to the actual price level in the marketplace. Nor is it clear whether the ona'ah price is publicly 
announced or whether market participants must research the ona'ah price for themselves at their own expense. 
As Ephraim Kleiman notes (1987: 26), “nowhere does the Talmud explicitly mention the reference price from 
which such a divergence is to be measured.” Warhaftig (1988: sec. “Introduction”) is equivocal on the matter, 
saying, “The correct price is officially set by the authorities or is the prevailing price in the marketplace.” 
Elsewhere, Warhaftig (1987: sec. “C. Summation and Application”) is more sure: according to the consensus 
view (inc. Maimonides), “the prices of essential items are fixed by the authorities,” and it is only in the view of 
Rashbam, he says, that prices are set by the market, because for Rashbam, ona'ah restricts profit with respect to 
costs, not a fixed price. Kleiman (1987: 26) disagrees, saying, “the relevant standard was none other than the 
going market price.”21 Levine (2012: 53) agrees with Kleiman, saying, “the reference price for an ona'ah claim is 
nothing other than the competitive norm.” However, neither Kleiman nor Levine reveal how this competitive 
norm is to be discovered when goods are heterogeneous and not all prices for a given good are identical.
Perhaps the intention of the law was that the courts would officially ratify as the fixed legal price 
whatever the prevailing market price already happened to be. In other words, when the courts thought that a 
general market rate had become settled (yatzah ha-sha'ar – cf. Levine 2012: 97), perhaps they would officially 
promulgate this as the fixed price, and any deviations from this price were considered ona'ah (cf. Kleiman 1987: 
37). Indeed, discussing hafka'at she'arim, Maimonides declares (Hil. Mekhira 14:1), “the beit din is obligated to 
fix prices,” which implies a publicly promulgated official price. Similarly, Maimonides wrote elsewhere that 
“the court is required to … set the prices” (Warhaftig 1987, quoting Hilkhot Geneiva 8:20 and SA HM 231:20-
21). Likewise, discussing hafka'at she'arim, Levine says (2012: 93), “the hayyei nefesh [essential foodstuffs] 
edict required the Jewish court to appoint price commissioners to supervise the marketplace.”22 Tamari (1987: 
95) speaks of when “a new communally adjusted price is announced.” Later, discussing ona'ah, Tamari similarly 
speaks of a publicly announced price, saying (1987: 97), “A just price cannot exist unless there exists a fixed 
price set through some legislative machinery.” 
However, the halakhah also specifies that the victim of ona'ah has only a limited time to object to the 
over- or under-charge, according to how long it is estimated it would take him to verify the proper price with an 
expert (Hil. Mekhira 12: 5-11; Warhaftig 1988: sec. “B. Period of Cancellation”; Kleiman 1987: 26; Tamari 
1987: 97f.; Tamari 1991: 78; Weissman 1998: 86-88). This implies that there is no officially posted price which 
can be easily looked up on a public bulletin, but rather, that the law of ona'ah enforces whatever the market price 
may happen to be, and that a person must verify for himself what that price actually is (Kleiman 1987: 34 n. 
19).23 So it may be that no fixed price was officially established at all, and instead, it was assumed that the 
market price would speak for itself. In summary, it is not clear whether ona'ah and hafka'at she'arim envision a 
publicly declared official price, or whether it assumes that the correct price is something which exists 
independently and objectively on its own. Perhaps the prices for the two laws were fixed in two entirely different 
manners, with the ona'ah price being something market participants must discover for themselves (cf. Hil. 
Mekhira 12: 5-11), but the hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh price being officially dictated and announced (cf. 
Hil. Mekhira 14: 1).
It is crucial to note as well that apart from the beit din (rabbinical court)'s authority to enforce ona'ah and 
hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh, there is a wholly distinct power resting in the corporate, (relatively) democratic 
Jewish community (Epstein 1985: i-ii; Warhaftig 1987: s.v. “6. Price Fixing”; Levine 2012: 202) to regulate 
wages and prices (Hil. Mekhira 14:9, quoted by Levine 2012: 108; Levine 2012: 202; Lew 1985: 126; Elon 
2008). As Meir Tamari notes (1991: 68), “the people of the city have the right to fix prices (either by majority 
vote for through their representatives)” (cf. Tamari 1987: 94). Itamar Warhaftig (1987 s.v. “6. Price Fixing”) 
quotes Tosefta BM 11:12: “The members of the community may determine prices and measures and wages, and 
they may enforce their decisions...” Similarly, Aaron Levine (2012: 108) quotes Maimonides, Hilkhot Mekhira 
14:9 (cf. Tamari 1987: 94): 
The residents of the city may agree among themselves to fix a price for any article they desire, 
even for meat and bread, and to stipulate that they will inflict such-and-such penalty upon one 
who violates the agreement.
Crucially, Aaron Levine comments on Hil. Mekhira 14:9, saying (Levine 2012: 108), “communal price-fixing 
legislation in the hayyei nefesh [i.e. essentials] sector may conflict with the 20% profit rate the Beit Din of the 
town sets for this sector” in enforcing the law of ona'ah or hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh. This appears to be a 
straightforward, unambiguous power to impose wage and price controls even beyond the controls already 
imposed by the laws of ona'ah and hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh.
It is not entirely clear whether ona'ah applies to wages as well. According to Shmuel Shilo, “it was laid 
down as halakhah that the law of overreaching [i.e. ona'ah] does not apply to the hire of laborers” (Elon and 
Shilo 2008, citing Yad, Mekhirah, 13:15). Aaron Levine concurs that ona'ah does not apply to most forms of 
wage-labor (Levine 2012: 193-197, 209). On the other hand, Itamar Warhaftig (1988, sec. “2. Transactions,” s.v. 
“b) employment”) notes that there are opinions on either side regarding whether wages are subject to ona'ah. But 
regardless, the corporate Jewish community did have the power to impose wage and price controls by some sort 
of (semi-)democratic procedure, entirely apart from the beit din's enforcement of ona'ah, as we saw earlier. Thus, 
Meir Tamari (1987: 149) quotes the Talmud, BB 8b: “The people of the city are permitted to regulate weights, 
prices, and the wages of workers. They also have the power to punish those who do not carry out their 
regulations.”24 Whether ona'ah applies to wages or not and whether ona'ah is a form of price-control or not, in 
any case wages were still subject to some form of price-control.25
II. Ona'ah Evaluated
With the basic characteristics of the laws now summarized, we will first evaluate whether ona'ah 
constitutes a price-control. According to several interpreters, ona'ah is not meant as a price-control which bans 
deviations from the official price. Instead, it is only a measure meant to protect market participants from 
ignorance and asymmetric information.26 This interpretation of ona'ah is based on an important exemptions to 
the law. Shmuel Shilo explains (Shilo and Elon 2008):
A stipulation between the parties stating, “on condition that there is no [prohibition of] 
overreaching [i.e. ona'ah] therein” (i.e., in the transaction), or “on condition that you have no 
claim of overreaching against me,” is invalid (Sh. Ar., ḤM 227:21),27 since the language used 
implies a stipulation contrary to a prohibition laid down in the Torah and one may not stipulate 
to set aside the Pentateuchal law; however, when the amounts involved in the transaction are 
specified, a stipulation of this nature is valid, since the injured party knows the precise amount 
of the overreaching to which he waives his right, and all stipulations in monetary matters are 
valid. … There is no [prohibition of] overreaching [i.e. ona'ah] as regards “one who trades on 
trust” [nosei be-emunah] (BM 51b). “How so? If the seller said to the purchaser 'I purchased this 
article for so and so much and I wish to earn thereon so and so much,' the purchaser will have no 
claim against him for overreaching” (Arukh ha-Shulḥan [HM] 227:28), “even if the 
overreaching amounts to more than one-sixth” (Yad, Mekhirah 14:1).
In other words, one cannot contractually stipulate that the very prohibition of ona'ah itself is nullified, but “one 
who trades on trust,” the nosei be-emunah can specify precisely how much he – the seller – is over- or under-
changing, and even if the discrepancy is greater than one-sixth, since the precise magnitude has been made 
explicit to the other person, the sale is legal.
The fact that ona'ah can be circumvented by full-disclosure shows that ona'ah is not meant as a price-
control but as a protection against asymmetric information (Weissman 1998: 90).28 For example, Meir Tamari 
argues (1991: 82; cf. 1987: 96f., 1986: 408)
This view of the law of ona'ah primarily as a legal protection against exploitation, rather than an 
intervention in the price-fixing mechanism of the market, may be seen in the ruling of 
Maimonides. He rules that there can be no claim of ona'ah in those cases where it was made 
perfectly clear that the price charged was above the market rate of 1/6 or more. In other words, 
once full disclosure has been made, there is no longer any question of exploitation or 
oppression.
Similarly, Warhaftig (1988: sec. “Introduction”) argues that ona'ah only applies when “one of the sides to the 
transaction is not aware that he is paying more or receiving less than that price.” And again, Warhaftig (1988: 
sec. “A. Definition”) states that the prohibition of ona'ah only applies when “the victim was not aware of the 
fraud and therefore it cannot be claimed that he waived or agreed to pay more than the market price.” Finally, 
Warhaftig (1988: sec. “D. Stipulation and Waiver”) concludes that,
Fraud is based on the withholding of information. It follows that if, for example, the seller 
explicitly stipulates that the price is higher than the market price, and the buyer accepts this, the 
laws of ona'ah are inapplicable.29
Furthermore, as Seth Winslow Weissman notes (1998: 87), the fact that the victim of ona'ah is given a deadline 
by which time he must have consulted an expert to appraise the value of his purchase, after which time he loses 
his claim, shows that ona'ah is meant to protect against asymmetric information.
Ephraim Kleiman (1987) has perhaps the most detailed argument that this is the intent of the law of 
ona'ah. After quoting TB BB 51b concerning the nosei be-emunah (1987: 29), the one who waives ona'ah by 
disclosing the discrepancy, Kleiman concludes that the law of ona'ah “seems to have been intended only to 
prevent sharp dealers from taking advantage of the customers' lack of information concerning the current market 
price.” He notes that the immediately following discussion in the Talmud is one prohibiting mixing new and old 
produce together in order to make the old produce falsely appear new, which he says (1987: 29) would “amount 
to what we would call in modern parlance truth in advertising or fair-trade regulations.” Interpreting the laws of 
ona'ah and fair-appearance together, Kleiman concludes (1987: 29)
Their aim was to ensure that transactions took place under conditions of, as far as possible, full 
information. And in the view of the Mishna, this applied not only to the quality of goods traded 
but also to their prices.
In addition, Weissman and Kleiman both note the existence of one opinion that merchants were not to 
protected by ona'ah, but only consumers, because merchants are experts (Kleiman 1987: 28 and Weissman 
1998:88f., both quoting TB BM 51a). Although this is not the accepted by the Talmud as the final law (cf. Hil. 
Mekhira 12:8), Kleiman and Weissman argue that even the rejected opinion reveals a consensus concerning the 
underlying purpose of the law, viz. to protect the weak and ignorant against exploitation by those with superior 
knowledge. Furthermore, Kleiman argues that the Talmudic laws of interest as applied to futures markets 
demonstrate an appreciation by the Talmud that prices do fluctuate in a market (Kleiman 1987: 33-38) and he 
argues (1987: 38) that
We may thus conclude that the price which was supposed to serve as the reference standard for 
overcharging was the shortest of all short-run market ones - the one obtaining at the particular 
locality and particular moment at which the transaction concerned was effected. Such a price has 
little to be said for it on either equity or efficiency grounds. The ethics of the ona'ah rule applied 
not to the price itself, but to the withholding of information about it.
If this is the purpose of ona'ah, then it is not a price-control at all. According to this interpretation, the 
law of ona'ah is not meant to ban deviations from a given price, but only to ensure that market prices are formed 
under conditions of full information. According to Tamari (1987: 99), “the law of ona'ah would seem to require 
a public policy requiring full disclosure of the market prices of basic commodities.” Later, Tamari suggested 
(1991: 85) that “the law of ona'ah would … seem to require communal or government action in order to make 
information about market prices freely available to all.” Thus, it appears that ona'ah would not constitute a 
problematic price-control (contra Block 1986, 1990, 2002).
Nevertheless, there are a few other potential problems with the prohibition which are worth pointing out. 
First, we should ask, is it moral to force merchants to give away information for free? Market research is costly, 
so why should merchants be forced to give their data away for free? The fundamental nature of entrepreneurship 
is acting on the basis of information and knowledge that not everyone else possesses (Kirzner 1973). Permitting 
merchants to profit on the basis of private information therefore serves as an incentive to discover new 
information and capitalize that information in new products. Therefore, the prohibition of ona'ah may serve as 
an undesirable disincentive against entrepreneurial activity (Block 1986, 1990 and 2002).30
Second, if producers and sellers are required to undertake market research at their own expense and to 
divulge the results of that information, it will be nearly impossible to know whether the cost is worth the benefit. 
Consumers will benefit, to be sure, but it may be that their benefit will be less than the cost undertaken by the 
sellers, and society will, on net, suffer a loss, not a gain. It would be preferable for a private firm to undertake 
market research and sell the results of their research to subscribers. In this way, it is feasible to way costs against 
benefits. If the money a person saves by subscribing to the market research bulletin is greater than the cost of the 
subscription fee, then there is a net benefit. But if the subscription fee is more costly than the savings one gets by 
having access to the information, then there is a net loss. By relying on the private market and the forces of 
supply-and-demand, one ensures that expensive and costly market research will be undertaken if and only if the 
benefits outweigh the costs. Making market research compulsory forestalls this process and creates the risk that 
research will be undertaken even when the costs exceed the benefits.
Third, in requiring the merchant to disclose the true cost or value of his wares, the law of ona'ah seems 
to presume the existence of a single “true” price that is distinct from the variable and indefinite market price. 
According to Warhaftig (1988: sec. “A. Definition”), one of the “assumptions at the base of this law” is that 
“there exists a standard market price from which the sale price deviated by a sixth or more.” But in fact, no such 
“standard market price” can possibly exist, and it is impossible to distinguish meaningfully between the 
generalized market price and the specific sale price. For a market is nothing but the collection of the individual 
interactions and transactions between willing participants, and so sale prices are not arbitrary and capricious 
deviations from some primeval, abstract market price. Instead, those sale prices embody valuable information, 
and those sales transactions are the market. The market is not something that exists independently of the sales 
that occur within the market. To the contrary, the market is the aggregation of those very same sales. To 
distinguish between the market price and the sale price makes as much sense as distinguishing between the 
temperature of the ocean and the temperature of the water in the ocean; the one is composed of the other. 
Therefore, scientifically speaking, the market price at any given time is the sale price. In other words, the market 
price of a good is only what it actually sells for in a given, specific transaction. Prices emerge from the 
confluence of supply and demand, and every price communicates valuable and unique information about the 
conditions of the market at that place and at that time (Hayek 1945, 1948). Every market transaction is unique, a 
sui generis event, and its price communicates essential data. Therefore, scientifically speaking, there is only one 
way to determine what the market price is: find out the latest terms of sale.   
Some scholars have caught a glimpse of the problem which heterogeneity poses to the law of ona'ah, but 
they have sometimes failed to realize its full significance. Meir Tamari (1986: 408; cf. Tamari 1987: 98) explains 
the Talmudic exemptions of sales of land, slaves, bills, and consecrated property from ona'ah as follows: “It may 
well be that the economic reason for this lies in the difficulty of assigning a price to these articles in view of the 
subjective evaluation involved.” To this, Walter E. Block replied (1986: 439), “Tamari quite correctly sees the 
'difficulty of assigning a price to [certain] articles in view of the subjective evaluation involved.' … He fails, 
however, to realize that subjective evaluations and differing attitudes toward risk apply to all purchases and sales 
in the market.”31 Similarly, Kleiman argues (1987: 30) concerning the exempted goods that “characteristic of all 
of them was the lack of a uniform market price.” But Kleiman does not notice that “the lack of a uniform market 
price” is characteristic of all goods, not only the goods which the Talmud exempted from ona'ah.32
If goods and market conditions are heterogeneous and constantly changing, then it is meaningless to 
speak of the “true” price of a good, and therefore, ona'ah cannot be reasonably enforced.33 Indeed, according to 
Warhaftig (1988: sec. “G. Contemporary Application”),
The law of price fraud, as developed in Jewish law, is based on two basic assumptions: a) The 
existence of a market price for the product; b) The ignorance of the buyer of the market price. 
Both these assumptions are problematic in a modern market. Can we speak of a market price 
today, when prices change from place to place and from time to time, and every seller does what 
he pleases? … [O]na'ah can be measured only for standardized products. In the conditions of a 
modern market, a seller can claim in many cases that his product cannot be compared to that of 
his competitors, and it is the responsibility of the plaintiff to prove that they are indeed 
equivalent.
Warhaftig concludes (1988: end of sec. “C. Exceptions”) that “in most cases today it is impossible to establish a 
market price.” Furthermore, he states (ibid. s.v. “G. Contemporary Applications”) that “in a completely free 
market, where every merchant has his own price[, t]here is is no market price, and therefore no ona'ah.”34 35 
Menachem Elon makes a similar argument that ona'ah is not applicable to a modern market, saying (Shilo and 
Elon 2008)
The unique nature of the prohibition against overreaching is expressed by the conditions of its 
application: (1) The article to be sold must have a known market value; (2) the buyer must be 
unaware of this market value. These conditions severely impede the implementation of the law 
in our times, as the vast majority of items sold do not have a fixed, uniform price, and prices 
may vary considerably from place to place and among different vendors. Furthermore, a buyer 
would have difficulty in convincing a court that he did not know that prices of goods are likely 
to vary.
In conclusion, it would appear that the law of ona'ah is not legally binding because goods are essentially 
heterogeneous and there is no such thing as “the” true price of a good. It is not merely the case that merchants 
can easily circumvent the prohibition of ona'ah by disclosing the extent of their over- or under-charge relative to 
the “true” price – although this is true. Rather, it is that there is no “true” price to begin with, and merchants have 
nothing to admit, and the law of ona'ah is no longer legally in force.36
III. Hafka'at She'arim / Hayyei Nefesh Evaluated
As we have seen, ona'ah does not constitute a price-control because the prohibition is waived upon full-
disclosure. However, the same is not true of hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh, the price-limitation on foodstuffs.
Whereas ona'ah may be waived, hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh cannot. As Warhaftig says (1988: sec. “F. 
Fraud...”), “Profit limitation is an obligation not subject to change through stipulation or waiver, unlike ona'ah.” 
And in the words of Maimonides (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Mekhira 14:1, trans. Levine 2012: 102):
We have already explained that he who does business on trust (nosei be-emunah) and says “I 
make so much and so much profit” is not subject to the law of overreaching (ona'ah), and even 
if he says “I bought this article for a sela and am selling it to you for ten,” it is legitimate.37 
Nevertheless, the court is obligated to regulate prices38 [lifsok ha-she'arim] and appoint officers 
of the law, so that people at large will not be able to reap whatever profit they desire, but should 
earn a profit of only one-sixth [i.e. 20%].
Maimonides immediately proceeds to clarify that this only applies to essential foodstuffs (Hil. Mekhira 14:2). 
According to Aaron Levine (2012: 104),
Maimonides conveys the notion that the price ceiling for hayyei nefesh items [i.e. essential 
foodstuffs covered by hafka'at she'arim] is absolute and precludes the possibility for S and B to 
strike a deal that effectively allows S to earn a profit in excess of 20%.
Whereas is permitted to commit ona'ah as long as one specifies the precise extent of the over-charge, in the 
specific case of foodstuffs, the rabbinical courts are required to enforce the one-sixth law of hafka'at she'arim / 
hayyei nefesh even when the market participants themselves wish to waive it. 
Quoting the Medieval commentator Rabbi Menahem ha-Meiri, Menachem Elon (2008) summarizes the 
distinction between ona'ah and hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh as follows: whereas ona'ah is a Torah 
prohibition which applies to all goods (except land, slaves, bills, and consecrated property),
The law of profiteering [i.e. hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh] on the other hand has its source in 
rabbinic enactment designed to prohibit the setting of prices in excess of the customarily 
accepted ones, even if the purchaser is aware of and agrees to the inflated price; “… even when 
he [the seller] says 'it cost me one sela and I want to earn two on it,' he has not transgressed the 
law of ona'ah but he is prohibited by rabbinic enactment [of hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh] 
from making a profit of more than one-sixth in essential commodities” ([Meiri,] Beit ha-
Behirah, BM 51b).
So even though ona'ah does not constitute a price-control, hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh is – on the 
contrary – most definitely a price-control. Whereas ona'ah is designed only to protect against information 
asymmetry, hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh is a full-blown control of prices. Indeed, Maimonides speaks 
explicitly of “appoint[ing] officers” because “the court is obligated to regulate prices.” Hence, Meyer S. Lew 
(1985: 42) states that “Maimonides ruled that punishment was to be meted out to those who raised prices. The 
community was duty bound to regulate commodity prices.”39 Similarly, Meir Tamari appears to be discussing 
hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh when he states (1991: 68; cf. 1987: 94, 1991: 70) that “The obligation of the 
beit din [rabbinical court] to appoint officials who, in addition to their role as supervisors of weights and 
measures, will control prices of basic goods is recognized by all the codes.”40
Moreover, as we saw earlier, the corporate, (relatively) democratic Jewish community (Epstein 1985: i-
ii; Warhaftig 1987: s.v. “6. Price Fixing”) possesses the power to regulate wages and prices independently of the 
beit din (rabbinical court)'s enforcement of the laws of ona'ah and hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh (Hil. 
Mekhira 14:9, quoted by Levine 2012: 108; Warhaftig 1987 s.v. “6. Price Fixing” quoting Tosefta BM 11:12; 
Lew 1985: 126; Elon 2008; Tamari 1991: 68, 1987: 94). This appears to be a straightforward, unambiguous 
power to impose wage and price controls even beyond any controls already imposed by the laws of ona'ah and 
hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh. In short, while ona'ah may not be a price-control, hafka'at she'arim / hayyei 
nefesh certainly is one.41 And the community's power to impose wage and price controls is exactly that. But we 
must ask, what would the economic effects of these laws be? Would these effects be desirable? And would these 
effects run counter to the intentions behind these laws?
IV. Price-Controls in Economics42
As we saw, hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh specifically fixes the prices of essential foodstuffs, and this 
gives us an insight into the intention of the law: presumably the law is meant to ensure a stable and reliable food 
supply especially for the poorest and weakest of society and especially in times of famines and other disasters. 
The question is, are the means appropriate to the ends? Because essentials are vital for the maintenance of life, 
the goal of the Rabbis was presumably to make sure they are always available. But since luxuries are not so 
important, it is not so crucial to guarantee continual access. However, the problem with adopting price controls 
for the necessities and allowing a free market for luxuries, is that paradoxically, the very opposite results will 
obtain than what was intended. That is, price controls are actually an impediment to continued supply of a good, 
while economic freedom is the best guarantee, at least on this side of the Garden of Eden, that shortages will not 
arise (Walker 1976). And so in fact, the means adopted – i.e. enforcement of hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh – 
are absolutely incompatible with the presumed ends of the Rabbis. Enforcement of hafka'at she'arim / hayyei 
nefesh would result in the very opposite of what was intended, and tragically so. Establishing and enforcing 
price-controls in essentials while allowing a free-market in luxuries will produce a paradox of continued 
plentiful supply of luxuries while essentials will dwindle into insufficiency, exactly the situation that was sought 
to be avoided. One may visit contemporary (early 2016) Venezuela for an idea of what this looks like.
The problem with all price controls is that prices – i.e. rates of exchange between two goods, or one 
good and money – have an essential role to play in an economy.43 Without exaggeration, they are the only means 
by which a large-scale society can function. The sole alternative to prices is central planning,44 but ever since the 
unraveling of the Soviet Union, most people are properly suspicious of central planning.45 Suppose that for some 
reason there is a surplus of mechanics and a shortage of electricians. The way the price system handles such a 
challenge is simplicity itself. The wage of mechanics falls, and that of electricians rises. This leads people who 
have attained or can attain both skills to switch from the former to the latter. Over the long-term, students just 
entering trade school will tend to decide to study to become electricians instead of mechanics, on account of the 
higher wages in the former. Similarly, if there is a great demand for cabbage and small demand for broccoli 
relative to supply, the price of the former will rise and that of the latter, fall. This will again tend to lead 
entrepreneurs, as if by an “invisible hand,” to tailor their offerings to the wishes of consumers. The higher price 
of cabbage will call forth more of this vegetable, and the lower price of broccoli will reduce incentives to bring 
that product to market, at least on the part of all those who attempt to maximize their returns. As for those who 
ignore these market signals, all other things being equal they will tend towards bankruptcy. It is in this way that a 
decentralized market can function in a rational manner without any central direction at all. This may not seem 
important to some, but it has great importance for our welfare; no less than the feeding, clothing and sheltering 
of the persons of humanity is at stake.
Price-controls, of course, prohibit the movement of prices without government permission. But in the 
time it takes for bureaucrats to discern the relative disequilibrium of mechanics and electricians, or of cabbage 
and broccoli – to say nothing of the hundreds of thousands of other items in a modern economy – there is no 
possibility of rectifying matters sufficiently so as to attain a smoothly functioning economy. In this regard 
hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh would not be a total disaster. Instead of preventing such price changes, it 
merely retards them. This Talmudic law allows prices to fluctuate plus or minus 20% from the official market 
price. If resources can be fully allocated by, say, a price change of only 10%, then hafka'at she'arim will have no 
explicit deleterious effect on the economy. But if full resource allocation is possible only with a price change of 
greater than 20%, say of 30%, then hafka'at she'arim will restrict the change to 20% and prohibit the most 
efficient use of society's resources and will therefore restrict the potential for consumer want-satisfaction.46
Profits are the means by which consumers signal to the producers and suppliers their priorities and 
preferences; and profit-and-loss signals therefore provide essential feedback in the market process (Coyne and 
Coyne 2015b: 9-12). If people come to fear they may not have enough eggs and cheese for their growing 
children, profits in egg and cheese production will rise. This will draw increasing investments into this industry – 
for investors seek profit opportunities – and draw investments away from competing industries. The increased 
investment will spur additional production in eggs and cheese, and production will be reduced in competing 
industries for which demand is less urgent and from which investment was withdrawn. But if the government 
artificially limits profits, this process will be frustrated according to the extent of the intervention. Profit controls 
serve like a perverse warning sign to the entrepreneur and investor. In the absence of controls, he had looked 
upon all investment opportunities on an equal basis, focusing on the items which people demonstrated were most 
important to them, so as to maximize his own returns by serving the customers to their own satisfaction. But 
now, with price controls and profit limitations, he will tend to avoid these options. There will be economic 
perversity as a consequence. Whereas in a free-market, resources flowed away from industries producing less 
urgently-required resources and towards industries producing essentials, once price-controls are imposed on 
essentials, the very opposite will occur. Resources will flow away from industries producing necessities, where 
they are most needed, and towards luxuries, where they are not. Given the presumed goal of the Rabbis, the 
mandate to impose regulation on necessities and to allow freedom for luxuries is the very opposite of what will 
best serve the community. Given the Rabbis' goals, then if we have to have government interference in the 
economy, it would be far better to control extravagant items and to leave essentials strictly alone. Were price-
controls to be imposed on luxuries and a free-market allowed in essentials, then investment would flow away 
from luxuries and towards essentials, and the goals of the Rabbis would be better accomplished.
One might object that all this is true only in the long-term, when production can adjust to new prices. 
Perhaps in the short-term, price-controls are actually beneficial for assisting the poor weather the adverse 
conditions. In the short-term, supply is relatively fixed – the supply curve is a vertical line – and so supply 
cannot adjust to prices anyway. However, price-controls are self-defeating in the short-term as well, due to their 
effect on demand. Whereas the quantity supplied will increase in the long-term in response to an increase in 
price, it is equally true that quantity demanded will decrease in the short-term in response to that same increase 
in price. In other words, prices serve to ration scarce supplies in the short-term by modulating demand. For 
example, suppose a famine has struck and there is only a small quantity of grain left. If the price is allowed to 
remain at its customary level, then consumers will continue to consume the same quantity of grain as they have 
before, unless strict rationing measures are imposed, such as establishing quotas or requiring rationing coupons 
in addition to money. But if the price of grain is allowed to rise in response to the shortage induced by the 
famine, then consumers will consume less grain in the short-term, stretching out the limited supply over a longer 
period until enough time has passed that supply can increase in response to the higher price. Therefore, not only 
are price-controls disastrous for their effect in reducing quantity supplied, but they cause equal damage in 
increasing quantity demanded, compared to the lesser quantity which would be demanded if the price were 
allowed to increase. Price-controls established in times of privation and famine thus serve to harm the very 
people they are intended to help in not one but two ways, like Marshall's analogy of the two blades of a scissors 
coming from opposite sides: when supplies are short, price-controls reduce the quantity supplied and increase 
the quantity demanded relative to what they would be in a free-market, thus making the famine or disaster 
doubly insufferable. The consequences of price-controls, therefore, are never what they aim to be, but instead, 
they produce queues (Coyne and Coyne 2015b: 19), black markets (Coyne and Coyne 2015b: 20), and product 
quality deterioration (Coyne and Coyne 2015b: 20). Price-controls even promote discrimination (Coyne and 
Coyne 2015b: 20, Levine 2012: 193). Ordinarily, a person can indulge in their racist or sexist – or otherwise 
discriminatory – preferences only by suffering a reduction to their profits. For example, if markets are clearing 
and supply equals demand, a person cannot refuse to sell to blacks unless they are willing to lose a substantial 
portion of their customer base. In fact, railroad firm lobbied against Jim Crow for precisely this reason (Gorman 
2008 quoting Roback 1986). But when minimum prices cause demand to exceed supply, discriminators can 
afford to indulge their preferences. If there are already more customers than there are supplies to sell them, then 
the seller loses little by deciding to sell only to whites. Thus, price-controls have several negative consequences 
aside from their simple promotion of surpluses and shortages.
For these reasons, one must reject the economic logic underlying the moral values expressed in Aaron 
Levine's statement that (1985a: 424):
Raising price on the basis of an upward shift of the demand curve is regarded in Jewish law as 
unethical when the shift is rooted in a changed circumstance, e.g. war, which makes the 
consumer's need for the product desperate. Similarly unethical is the raising of a price when the 
shift is due to an artificially created need by dint of religious law.
First, Levine has confused an upward or rightward shift of the demand curve with a downward or leftward shift 
of the supply curve. Warfare does not increase demand but rather it decreases supply. It is not that people wish to 
eat more food in wartime than they used to consume in peacetime; it is rather that war makes food harder to 
come by at any given price. Invading armies of the time lacked supply lines, and they sustained themselves from 
the fields. They may have also burned whatever they could consume themselves. Therefore, the supply of all 
crops at a given price would have shifted left. Now, it is true that demand will shift right as consumers 
speculatively anticipate a future rise in prices due to the supply shock. In other words, consumers will be willing 
to spend more for a given quantity of food in the present because they anticipate that prices will rise in the future 
because of the war. But this rightward shift in demand is in response to the anticipated leftward shift in supply. 
Therefore, the principal effect of warfare is a leftward supply shock, and the rightward shift in demand is merely 
a secondary response to that supply shock. Levine has somehow neglected the primary shift in supply and 
focused on the secondary shift in demand. In any case, however, Levine has failed to realize that a price-control 
in this situation will be self-defeating and harm the very people it is meant to help. The economist qua economist 
cannot pass judgment on normative, ethical values, but it is his sworn duty to highlight when the means are 
inappropriate to the end. Here, when warfare has caused a decrease in the supply of essential goods, prices must 
be allowed to increase for two reasons: first, to call forth an increase in supply, and second, to reduce quantity 
demanded and allocate the limited supply that remains. If, on the contrary, a price-control is imposed, then there 
will be no incentive for suppliers to alleviate the privation and consumers will consume too much and fail to 
economize the limited supply. As an economist, Aaron Levine cannot dispute the ethical claim made by Judaism. 
But as an economist, he should have argued that the Jewish insistence on a price-control in these situations 
would harm the very people meant to be helped. The economist must always be value-free and never question a 
normative value, but as a positive scientist, his task is to show when the means chosen will fail to accomplish the 
given normative end. Judaism is entitled to demand a price-control in these situations, but it must realize that it 
will be defeating itself and frustrating the accomplishment of its (Judaism's) own desires. Levine (1985b: 447) is 
completely wrong to argue that a price-control in a situation of scarcity or shortage “would not really impose 
much of a problem in terms of resource allocation.” Similarly, the positive economist cannot agree with Meir 
Tamari's assertion that trade restrictions are legitimate where the merchant is “earning excessive profits or where 
there is no benefit to the consumer” (Tamari 1991: 69). Because all prices communicate essential information 
(Hayek 1945) and because price-signals alone efficiently promote economic coordination, there is, in general, no 
scientific way to declare that a profit is excessive or detrimental to the consumer. Profit-and-loss signals provide 
feedback which is essential to the healthy and effective operation of the market process (Coyne and Coyne 
2015b: 9-12).
V. A Few More Remarks on Ona'ah
Let us make a few relatively tangential remarks on ona'ah. As we saw earlier, Menachem Elon argues 
that the prohibition of ona'ah is no longer legally binding because goods are too heterogeneous for there to be 
such a thing as the “true” price of a good. But Elon himself proceeds to belie his own words when he testifies – 
crucially, without objection or complaint – that the laws of ona'ah have in fact influenced civil law in the modern 
State of Israel (Elon 2008; cf. Tamari 1987: 99):
In the State of Israel there are a number of laws designed to combat profiteering in essential 
commodities. The Commodities and Services (Control) Law, 5718 – 1957, provides for various 
means of supervision over commodities declared to be subject to control by the minister charged 
with implementation of the law, enforcible on pain of imprisonment, fine, and closing down of a 
business, etc. The Tenants' Protection Laws, 5714 – 1954 and 5715 – 1955, control maximum 
rentals for residential and business premises and also limit the right of ejectment to grounds 
specified in these laws only. These laws are supplemented by the provisions of the Key Money 
Law, 5718 – 1958. The Restrictive Trade Practices Law, 5719 – 1959, restricts, among others, 
the artificial manipulation of price levels at the hands of a monopoly or cartel. In the Knesset 
debates preceding the passing of these laws, some members relied on Jewish law in support of 
their arguments (Divrei ha-Keneset vol. 7, p. 564; vol. 14, p. 1822; vol. 18, p. 2176; vol. 21, p. 
169; vols. 23, pp. 372, 374, 383; vol. 24, pp. 2478, 2514).
Elon fails to object that under Israeli law – unlike the halakhah – buyers and sellers cannot evade the 
price-controls by announcing the precise extent of the divergence. If ona'ah is meant only as a protection against 
asymmetric information, and if ona'ah is waived in the case of full-disclosure, then it cannot be used as a 
justification or basis for a conventional rent-control ordinance, which typically is binding even in the case of 
full-disclosure. It is strange that Elon thought it irrelevant that the halakhah of ona'ah – unlike Israeli law of 
rent-control – provides for a means by which to circumvent the law. Nor does Elon recall his earlier objection 
that ona'ah in general should not apply to a modern economy where goods are heterogeneous and prices 
disparate.
And since Elon mentioned the Tenants' Protection Law, a brief remark on rent-control may be warranted. 
The same analysis we gave previously concerning price-controls is equally applicable to rent-control (Block and 
Olsen 1985, Morton 2001: 52f., Rockoff 2008, Bourne 2015), including in Israel (Werczberger 1988, cited in 
Bourne 2015: 76). Well-intentioned politicians and government officials, concerned with housing shortages and 
high prices, especially for the poor, have enacted such legislation in order to improve matters. Instead, the very 
opposite has occurred. The controls serve as a warning device, alerting entrepreneurs of the dangers of any 
investment in housing. Landlords tend to neglect maintenance because rent is too low to pay for proper 
maintenance, and rental housing quality deteriorates. New construction of rental property tends to cease, and 
existing rental properties are converted into owner-occupied housing or into commercial and office space, which 
are not rent-controlled. Even the fear of possible future rent controls can have these effects, thus, paradoxically, 
raising prices, and reducing vacancy rates. In contrast, luxury high-rise office towers, hotels, shopping centers 
and industrial parks have never been subjected to rent controls, and as a result, there are no shortages in these 
markets, and vacancy rates are oft-times in the double digit range. As Swedish economist Assar Lindbeck noted, 
“In many cases rent control appears to be the most effective technique presently known to destroy a city – except 
for bombing” (quoted in Bourne 2015: 73). Many of these effects exhibited themselves in Israel as well, where 
the imposition of rent-control led to a halt in construction of new rental housing (Werczberger 1988: 282) and 
neglect of maintenance (Werczberger 1988: 286). The damage caused by rent-control in Israel was mitigated by 
the exemption from rent-control of all properties built after 1953 (Werczberger 1988 passim), by the significant 
trend from rental to owner-occupied housing (Werczberger 1988 passim), and by the legalization of key money 
(security deposit) in 1958 (Werczberger 1988: 279). Key money allowed tenants and landlords to capitalize and 
internalize the benefits of rent-control (Werczberger 1988: 288), essentially converting the forgone rent into an 
alternative form not subject to rent-control. In other words, rent-control did relatively minimal damage only 
because it was effectively repealed and circumvented relatively quickly.
Meanwhile, we might note that the wages of workers are just another price, and as with all other forms 
of price-control, intervention in wage-rates will produce either shortages or surpluses (unemployment). For 
example, where minimum wages or mandatory union membership drive wages above the market-clearing rate, 
employers will reduce their demand for employees, producing permanent unemployment (Siebert 2015, Levine 
2012: 191-193, 209). Ironically, then, the minimum wage hurts the very people it is meant to meant to help, 
producing self-defeating consequences (Levine 2012: 191-193, 209). For this reason and others as well, Aaron 
Levine argues that Jewish law would reject any form of minimum wage (Levine 2012: 191-210). But as we saw 
earlier, the corporate community had the power to democratically regulate wages independent of the rabbinical 
court. Even though fixing wages would presumably have been intended to safeguard the workers' standard of 
life, their more likely consequence, if sufficiently enforced, would have been to create permanent 
unemployment. 
Aaron Levine, concluding that Jewish law cannot countenance the imposition of legislated minimum 
wages, argues that the community's power to regulate wages ought to be utilized instead to judge certain 
contracts as unconscionable – for example, a private employment contract stipulating that the employee is 
forbidden to seek additional employment on the side even though the employee's wage is insufficient to live on 
(Levine 2012: 202-204). Let us suppose for the sake of argument that such a contract nullification would have no 
negative effects. The problem is that Levine nowhere indicates what would constrain the democratic community 
to use its power only in such responsible ways. It is not enough to argue that the community ought to limit the 
exercise of its own power. Such a mere warning without institutional safeguards will turn out to be impotent. As 
Lord Acton famously declared (1887), “All power tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely.” 
Therefore, Thomas Jefferson declared (1798), “In questions of powers, then, let no more be heard of confidence 
in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution.” And as James Madison warned 
(1788), “In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: 
you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.” 
Unfortunately, Levine does not indicate that there are any constitutional limitations on the democratic 
community's power to impose wage-controls. And voters tend not only to be rationally ignorant, but they often 
vote expressively based on what makes them feel good or what satisfies their consciences (Caplan 2007). It is 
not hard to imagine the electorate of the Jewish community voting to impose wage-floors, naively and 
idealistically believing that this will improve the welfare of the poor. But according to Levine, there seem to be 
no institutional safeguards against such abuse of democratic power. A robust political system cannot trust in 
blind faith that the right people will be in power. Robustness in political economy means ensuring tolerably good 
results even under adverse, sub-optimal conditions (Pennington 2011). An unconstrained democratic power to 
impose wage and price-controls fails to satisfy this criterion. Perhaps a corollary of Murphy's Law is in order: if 
power – even democratic power – can be abused, it will be.
VI. Restrictions Against Middlemen and Speculators
Given these negative effects of price-controls, it is profoundly unfortunate that Talmudic economic 
regulations were applied against speculators and middlemen as well (Hil. Mekhira 14: 4-8; Warhaftig 1987 
passim; Tamari 1987: 88-90, 1986: 406; Kleiman 1987: 35f.), whom economic science today recognizes as 
performing indispensably valuable roles when they are allowed to act freely. According to Menachem Elon 
(2008),
Particular care was taken to maintain a cheap supply of essential products in Ereẓ Israel [i.e. the 
Land of Israel], where no middleman between producer and consumer was tolerated: “It is 
forbidden to speculate in essential commodities in Ereẓ Israel but everyone shall bring from his 
barn and sell so that these [commodities] may be sold cheaply” (Tosef. Av. Zar. 4:1; BB 91a, Yad,  
Mekhirah 14:4; Sh. Ar. ḤM 231:23); however, it was decided that in the case of a commodity in 
free supply or where a middleman worked to prepare and process the product, such as baking 
bread from wheat, profit-making was permitted, even in Ereẓ Israel (Tosef. Av. Zar. 4:1; BB 91a 
and Rashbam, Yad Ramah and Beit ha-Behirah ibid.; Yad, Mekhirah 14:4; Sh. Ar., ḤM 231:23). 
The sages sought in various ways to eliminate the factors which made for a climate for 
profiteering. Thus it was forbidden to hoard produce bought on the market, lest this cause prices 
to rise and bring losses to the poor, and in a year of famine no hoarding at all was permitted (not 
as much as a “cab of carobs”), not even of the produce harvested from one's own field (BB 90b; 
Yad, Mekhirah 14:5–7).
Similarly Isidore Epstein (1985: iv):47
For the same reason [viz. 'safeguarding the standards of life of the consumer'] provision was 
made cutting out the middleman’s profit in the case of eggs ... The prohibition applies apparently 
to all foodstuffs.
Likewise Meyer S. Lew (1985: 185):48
Wholesalers of foods were only to have a small profit while retailers were allowed a larger 
margin. Similarly, the Talmud forbids agencies or middlemen to deal in articles of food. The 
farmer was to sell direct to the consumer.
Finally, Meir Tamari (1991: 69):49
This would place the halakhah in favor of direct producer-consumer marketing arrangements in 
agricultural produce, which negate the profits of the middlemen. … Essential goods may not be 
bought up by speculators hoping to resell them in times of scarcity.
Furthermore, Meir Tamari links the profit-limitation of hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh (which applies only to 
essential foodstuffs) with the restrictions on middlemen, saying (Tamari 1991: 68; cf. Tamari 1987: 89) that there 
are 
a number of Talmudic statements that disapprove of profits earned in the trade of basic goods 
essential to the individual's welfare, and sometimes even the trade itself.
These enactments and injunctions betray a fundamental misunderstanding of the economic roles of 
middlemen and of hoarders and speculators. When a speculator buys up a large quantity of the supply today, it 
can only be to sell it sometime in the future. The speculator does not plan on consuming everything himself; he 
can profit only by eventually relinquishing his hoard. Nothing is being destroyed or disposed of; everything the 
speculator purchases, he purchases to sell again. Therefore, we must ask why he does this. The answer is that the 
speculator, in buying when prices are low and selling when prices are high, is in fact doing nothing other than 
buying when supplies are plentiful and selling when supplies are scarce. By doing so, he evens out the 
fluctuations in the long-term; he prevents prices from rising in times of privation as much as they would have 
risen without him. By buying when prices are low, he reduces the supply at a time when the supply is plentiful, 
and by selling when prices are high, he increases supply at the time when supply is scarce. For example, suppose 
that today there is a supply of one million lbs. of wheat at a price of $1/lb. And suppose the speculator believes 
that a famine is coming, and that next year, there will be only 100,000 lbs. of wheat at a price of $10/lb. So he 
purchases 300,000 lbs. of wheat today, driving up the price to perhaps $3/lb. today. But next year, when the 
famine arrives and the price of wheat rises to $10/lb. because there is only 100,000 lbs. available, he releases his 
hoard of 300,000 lbs. onto the market, increasing the supply from 100,000 lbs. to 400,000 lbs. of wheat, and 
decreasing the price from $10/lb. to say $6/lb. Without the speculator, there would have been a fluctuation from 
year to year, from one million pounds at $1/lb. in the present to only 100,000 lbs. at $10/lb. the next year. But the 
speculator evened out the fluctuation so that there was 700,000 lbs. at $3/lb. now and 400,000 lbs. at $6/lb in a 
year. The speculator reduces the supply and increases the price at a time of plenitude and decreases the price and 
increases the supply in the future, at a time of famine. Yes, the speculator does profit: he spent say $300,000 
(300,000 lbs. at $1/lb.) and earned back $3 million (300,000 lbs. at $10/lb.), making a profit of $2,700,000 (also 
minus the interest foregone). But what a service he has done to the community, saving them from famine! His 
profit is nothing other than the signal and symbol of how much good he has performed for others (cf. Holcombe 
2014: 394f., s.v. “Where do dissipated transitional profits go?”). Therefore, when the halakhah punishes 
speculation and hoarding, this does nothing other than to potentially condemn the innocent to privation or even 
starvation. The speculator does almost exactly what Joseph did in the famous Biblical story, when he foresaw 
through prophecy the coming lean years and stored up grain in the royal granaries – and yet whereas the Bible 
upholds Joseph as a hero, the halakhah condemns the non-prophetic speculator as a villain.
The animus against middlemen is similarly ill-conceived.50 It might be thought that middlemen do 
nothing but tack on a profit without doing anything productive. According to Itamar Warhaftig (1987: sec. “3”), 
“One of the contributory causes of high prices is excessive intermediary trading as every additional middleman 
adds to the final price.” However, this is the opposite of the truth. Warhaftig adds (1987: sec. “C”) that “It is well 
known that the prices of fruits and vegetables are elevated by unnecessary intermediate trading.” Maybe this is 
well-known, but it was also well-known in antiquity that the sun revolves around the earth and that illnesses are 
caused by an excess of humors. Similarly, Meir Tamari says (1986: 406), “the sages of the Talmud saw the 
increased costs caused by middlemen as detrimental the poor and weaker classes.” But as Walter E. Block said to 
Tamari (Block 1986: 440), “If so, then the sages were seeing something that simply is not true.” The only way 
that a middleman can attract business is by offering either a lower price or greater ease and convenience. 
Suppose wholesaler A is selling to customer B. Retailer (middleman) C can break into this chain and insert 
himself as an intermediary only by offering terms that are simultaneously better to both A and to B. Wholesaler 
A will not sell to retailer C and customer B will not buy from retailer C unless A and B both benefit from 
permitting C to intervene in the middle of the chain. The retailer frees the customer from the burden of having to 
deal with a separate wholesaler for every one of the hundreds of different goods he purchases. Meanwhile, the 
retailer frees the wholesaler to concentrate on his specific area of comparative advantage - viz. production – 
instead of areas where the wholesaler is less competent. If this were not so, if the consumer and wholesaler could 
both save money, time, and effort by dealing directly with each other, then neither would bother to interact with 
the retailer or middleman. Thus, the middleman does not increase costs, but on the contrary, he decreases them. 
As the colonial American Reverend John Witherspoon (one of the teachers of James Madison) observed in 1786 
(McDurmon 2010: 56f), the authors of legislation restricting middlemen
considered that every hand through which a commodity passed must have a profit upon it, which 
would therefore greatly augment the cost to the consumer at last. But could anything in the 
world be more absurd? … [I]t may be safely affirmed that the more merchants, the cheaper [the] 
goods, and that no carriage is so cheap, nor any distribution so equal or so plentiful, as that 
which is made by those who have an interest in it and expect a profit from it.
Furthermore, transportation does nothing less than to fundamentally transform a good from one good 
into another. An apple in New York City is not the same good as an apple in New Orleans. If the two goods were 
identical, then the inhabitant of New Orleans would be indifferent between them. But since the inhabitant of 
New Orleans definitely prefers apples in New Orleans to apples in New York, this demonstrates that the two 
goods are not the same. Transporting an apple from one place to another performs an economic transformation 
of its utility every bit as real as the man who prunes the apple tree. The processes of growing apples and 
transporting them are physically distinct, but economically speaking, they both transform goods from one kind to 
another and create utility or value where there was none before. As Thomas Sowell notes (1975: 68f.)
If the same physical thing is assumed to have the same value without regard to space or time, 
then the middleman is simply cheating people. … In reality, they [the producer and consumer] 
deal through the middleman because he is changing the value of things by relocating them, 
holding them to times that are more convenient, assuming various risks by stocking inventories 
– and doing so at less cost than either the producer or consumer could. … In short, middlemen 
can continue to exist only insofar as they can perform certain functions more cheaply than either 
the producer or consumer. But no matter how varied and complex these functions may be, they 
amount ultimately to relocating things in time and space, and the physical fallacy which denies 
value to that operation necessarily indicts middlemen as mere cheaters.51
According to Warhaftig (1987: sec. “3”), these restrictions on middlemen no longer apply in a modern 
economy. In his words, 
It is possible that in a modern economy, it is no longer true that the owner can sell to the public 
without effort, and therefore he is permitted to sell through a middleman. Since the middleman 
is expending effort to make the product available throughout the sales network, he is also 
entitled to a profit.
However, this was equally true in the time of the Talmud. It has always been true that middlemen expend effort. 
And it has never been the case that farmers could sell to the public without effort. On the contrary, if farmers had 
ever been able to sell to the public with less effort than the middlemen, then the middleman would not have 
come into existence. It was precisely because the middleman's opportunity costs were less that he was able to 
charge lower prices than the farmer would have been able to. If it took less effort – measured by individual 
subjective opportunity cost – for a farmer to sell his produce than it took a middleman, then a farmer would be 
able to undercut the middleman's prices. The fact that middlemen exist proves that they lower prices and incur a 
smaller opportunity cost. Nevertheless, we thank Warhaftig for arguing that the Talmud's restrictions on 
middlemen no longer apply, even if his reason was equally true when the Talmud was written.
Meanwhile, Keith Sharfman (2006) has attempted to defend the Talmudic regulations against speculation 
using Martin Weitzman's “shortage syndrome” model. Following Weitzman, Sharfman argues that speculation is 
inefficient “when a market is not clearing for some reason, such as when there is a state-mandated price ceiling 
on the relevant commodity” (Sharfman 2006: 190). When prices are below market-clearing and quantity 
demanded exceeds quantity supplied, then queues will develop and the first consumers in the queue will hoard 
more than is efficient given the “true” equilibrium price. According to Sharfman (2006: 190),
The most obvious policy solution to the shortage/hoarding phenomenon is to allow prices to 
rise. But this may be politically untenable in some circumstances. An alternative, second best 
solution is to initiate some kind of anti-hoarding policy.
At this point, Sharfman (2006: 191) introduces the “sixteen percent rule” and argues that it “has many of the 
same characteristics as the price controls contemplated in the Weitzman model.”52 Sharfman leaves it as an open 
question “whether the sixteen percent rule makes good policy sense” (2006: 191), but says that “we may take the 
rule as a given constraint” (2006: 191). Taking the “sixteen percent rule” as a given, Sharfman speculates that the 
Talmudic restrictions on speculation are an effective response to inefficient hoarding and queuing caused by the 
imposition of price-controls (2006: 191). But a few complications are worth noticing: first, Sharfman argues that 
what is problematic is not professional speculation but rather consumer hoarding (2006: 183, 184, 187, 190). By 
contrast, the tenor of the treatments by most other authors suggests the Talmud was more concerned with 
professional speculators. For example, Warhaftig speaks (1987: sec. “2”) of “when a merchant withholds a 
product until a shortage develops in order to cause a price rise” and he adds (1987: sec. “C”) that “[t]he 
prohibition applies to the merchant and to the consumer” alike. Second, Sharfman's defense does not account for 
the Talmud's criticism of middlemen. But most importantly of all, what Sharfman's analysis really proves is not 
that speculation ought to be restricted, but that the price-control of hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh ought to be 
abolished. If price-controls cause queues, hoarding, and shortages, then the most reasonable response is to repeal 
price-controls. Thus, Sharfman's argument actually reinforces our own, that the prohibition of hafka'at she'arim / 
hayyei nefesh is undesirable and inefficient. It may be that it is political inexpedient to repeal the price-control, 
but that is a tragedy deserving only lament.
VII. Economic Intervention: A Self-Defeating Morality
Therefore, price-control legislation will do little to help the poor and suffering, and will in fact do much 
to make their straits even worse. And yet according to Isidore Epstein, all these economic regulations have an 
ethical basis, for he prefaces a discussion of Talmudic economic legislation by stating (1962: i),
morality was made the dominating factor of communal life, and the underlying principle of all 
legislation regulating social and economic relations.
Similarly, according to Menachem Elon (2008),53
Certain authorities even regard the prohibition [of ona'ah specifically] as being religiously 
based, unrelated to civil law (Rabbenu Hanannel, BM 51b; Asheri, BM 4:7), indicating that this 
law originated from the ethical imperative of conducting business fairly and amicably, based on 
the verse “that your brother may live with you” (Lev. 25:36).
As Elon shows, this is not the universal view, but it lends support to the suggestion that the laws prohibiting 
ona'ah and hafka'at she'arim were enacted with an intention towards justice and fairness. 
Warren Goldstein also interprets these laws as having an ethical basis, and he explicitly specifies that the 
goal is to improve the welfare and quality-of-life of the poor. In a work dedicated to demonstrating how Jewish 
law aimed at “defending the human spirit from abuse by the powerful” (2006: 1), Goldstein states (2006: 447),54
Jewish law ... intervenes to help the poor. For example, price controls are imposed on essential 
goods to make them affordable to the poor. Such an intervention benefits people ... The poor can 
thus benefit, together with others.
Similarly, in a “volume ... show[ing] that justice, equity and humanity are central to the halakhah” (Lew 1985: 
ix), Dayan (rabbinical judge) Meyer S. Lew argues (1985: 5),
That justice and compassion motivated the many rabbinical and communal enactments and 
ordinances adopted and applied by the religious and lay leaders through the ages is further proof 
of a deep concern for the weal of the community, the welfare of the family and the rights and 
freedoms of the individual.
Moreover, according to Lew, not only were the “rabbinical and communal enactments and ordinances” in 
general meant to further “the weal of the community”, but price-controls specifically were intended to improve 
the quality-of-life of the poor (Lew 1985: 184f.):55
The Rabbis regarded the raising of prices above their actual value as a serious threat to the 
economic welfare of the public. … It is obvious that these rules were designed to control prices 
which would otherwise be higher and bear harshly upon the poor. … In any event care was taken 
to prevent unscrupulous merchants from taking advantage of the poor.
Similarly, Isidore Epstein states (1962: iv),
the prices were fixed not at individual discretion, but were corporately determined with a view 
to safeguarding the standards of life of the consumers.
Likewise, Itamar Warhaftig concludes (1987: sec. “C. Summation and Application”),
there exists a measure of intervention and supervision designed to ensure that the lower 
economic classes will be able to purchase essential items at affordable prices.
According to Meir Tamari (1987: 91), “The basic concern behind these injunctions … was the welfare of the 
average consumer.” And finally, Aaron Levine states that according to Rabbi Joshua ben Alexander ha-Kohen 
Falk (Semah), the purpose of these laws is “to allow consumers to achieve subsistence without undue hardship” 
(Levine 2012: 93). 
These scholars all argue that the Talmudic economic regulations are not intended as a purely moral 
(deontological) measure, but they specify a consequentialist aim.56 The price-controls are imposed, not because 
they are inherently just and righteous and fair regardless of consequences, but quite to the contrary, these laws 
were created in order to improve the lives of the poor in a practical, consequentialist sense. How tragic then, that 
in all likelihood, these laws would have the exact opposite consequence, and tend to make life worse for nearly 
everybody. In other words, these laws would tend to be self-defeating, accomplishing the very opposite of their 
intentions. Therefore, our present criticism of Talmudic economic regulations is not based on a foreign, non-
Jewish ethical standard. Instead, these halakhot are ineffective at accomplishing a specifically Jewish end. We 
are not rejecting the ethical end of Judaism in favor of some other religion or philosophy, but rather, we are 
criticizing Jewish authorities for having selected a means that is inappropriate for their specifically Jewish end 
(cf. Milton Friedman 1985: 408; Block and Hexham 1986: 451, 455f.).
Furthermore, if the Talmudic economic regulations would tend to make miserable the lives on innocent 
human beings, we might justifiably ask, what can be the worthiness of an ethic which makes life almost 
universally less enjoyable? Surely material quality-of-life itself has some ethical value. After all, the prophet did 
declare, “the L-rd that created the heavens, He is G-d; that formed the earth and made it, He established it, He 
created it not a waste, He formed it to be inhabited” (Isaiah 45:18). Moreover, there is evidence that the 
Talmudic legislation was definitely intended – at least partially – to promote material welfare: for when the price 
of sacrificial doves increased, Rabbi Simeon ben Gamliel famously taught that women who were previously 
obligated to bring five sacrifices henceforth needed to bring only one.57 Similarly, the rabbi Samuel threatened to 
change his opinion and teach more leniently that certain utensils were kosher after the Passover and that certain 
myrtles were kosher for the lulav on Sukkot (Feast of Tabernacles) unless the merchants selling those items 
would lower their prices.58 All this suggests that consequentialist considerations played at least some role in the 
establishment of the Talmud's social legislation. Apparently the Talmud did not have a purely consequences-
indifferent, “come hell or high water” deontological notion of justice and morality. And so without committing 
ourselves  to full-blown consequentialism, it nevertheless appears that a business or social ethic which produces 
almost exclusively negative practical consequences must at least be doubtful, and should be faced with 
skepticism. According to Roderick T. Long (2002),
Whatever they may say officially, most consequentialists would be deeply disturbed to discover 
that their favoured policies slighted human dignity, and most deontologists would be deeply 
disturbed to discover that their favoured policies had disastrous consequences.
Long adds (2012),
one of the advantages of the eudaimonistic approach, as I understand it, is that it avoids both the 
excessive consequence-sensitivity of utilitarianism and the excessive consequence-insensitivity 
of deontology.
Furthermore, Long states (2013),
the fact that all but the hardiest deontologists generally try to show that their favoured policies 
will in fact have good consequences, while all but the hardiest consequentialists generally try to 
show that they’re not committed to morally outrageous conclusions, suggests that most 
professed deontologists and consequentialists are actually, to their credit, crypto-eudaimonists. 
Therefore, if the laws in question – viz. hafka'at she'arim, regulations against middlemen and 
speculation, and communal imposition of wage and price controls – would tend to produce almost universally 
and exclusively negative consequences, we should at least be skeptical of how moral or just those laws can really 
be. These laws could perhaps turn out to be an example of what Derek Parfit called a “self-defeating morality” 
(1979: 533):
There are certain things we ought to try to achieve. Call these our moral aims. Our moral theory 
would be self-defeating if we believed we ought to do what will cause our moral aims to be 
worse achieved.
According to Parfit, a moral theory is “formally self-defeating” when a moral theory that is an end unto itself 
irrespective of the consequences, fails to be accomplished. He does not reference Kantian deontology, but that 
appears to be something like what he means by a moral theory that is an end unto itself. Such a moral theory is 
formally self-defeating when it fails to be executed. By contrast, a moral theory is “substantively self-defeating” 
when the moral theory intends certain “substantive aims” or consequences which fail to be accomplished by the 
performance of the stipulated causal action.59 Parfit's examples all fall into the categories of prisoner's dilemmas 
and public goods, where private and social costs and benefits diverge. In these cases, a moral theory which 
specifies one ought to take action for one's own personal benefit (or for one's own family) will produce worse 
consequences not only for others but even for oneself, compared to if one had violated the moral theory and 
instead acted for others (or for others' families). In such cases, Parfit says, the self-interested moral theory is 
“self-defeating.” In other words, if a moral theory specifies some aim to be accomplished, then that 
accomplishment must somehow matter at least to some degree, and the moral theory is self-defeating if that aim 
fails to be accomplished by the performance of the stipulated action. The halakhah's economic regulations 
appear to fall into this category; they intend lofty and admirable moral aims, but their enforcement would tend to 
produce consequences the very opposite of what they intended.
VIII. Aaron Levine's Interpretation of the Essential Foodstuffs Profit-limitation
But Aaron Levine's interpretation of the profit-limitation (hafka'at she'arim) ordinance concerning 
essential foodstuffs (hayyei nefesh) is unique and requires its own treatment.60 Levine notes from the outset of 
his analysis that price-controls are self-defeating (Levine 2012: 22, 93-95, 110). He recognizes that prices serve 
as signals (Levine 2012: 93) directing the allocation of resources (Levine 2012: 94), and that profits serve the 
same function as well (Levine 2012: 94). Price-controls will generally result in shortages, black markets, and the 
necessity for rationing (Levine 2012: 94). Furthermore, price-controls discourage new entry by alternate 
suppliers (Levine 2012: 94). Therefore, he attempts to show that the profit-limitation of hafka'at she'arim is not a 
price-control at all. In Levine's interpretation (2012: 106), “the rabbis set the price ceiling above the equilibrium 
price” (cf. Levine 2012: 107, 110, 111). But the price ceiling is not the price which the rabbis enforce. As Levine 
says (2012: 107, 111),61 “Because the price ceiling is a matter of public knowledge, some may, however, 
erroneously regard it as a mandated price.” In fact, it is not the rabbinic price ceiling but rather the equilibrium 
market price which constitutes the mandated price which binds sellers. “It is the role of these supervisors to 
survey the marketplace and make sure that no one sells above the competitive norm” (Levine 2012: 107; cf. 
2012: 111). If the sellers are bound, not by the rabbinic price ceiling but rather by the competitive market price, 
then what function does the rabbinic price ceiling serve? Levine answers that “the usefulness of setting a price 
ceiling is that it signals the rabbis when remedial measures should be put in place … [including] a rationing 
system” (Levine 2012: 107, 111),62 to be implemented after the market price has increased such that “the price 
ceiling becomes the competitive norm” (Levine 2012: 107, 111).63 In other words, sellers are bound by the 
competitive market price itself, and the price commissioners of the court enforce the market price, not the price 
ceiling. The function of the price ceiling is only to serve as a signal; once the market price increases to the point 
that it equals or exceeds the price ceiling, then further interventions become warranted, including non-price 
rationing (cf. Levine 1985a: 423). For Levine, the market price is to be allowed to freely fluctuate, but if supply 
shocks (Levine 2012: 107) cause the competitive market rate to increase until it reaches the official price ceiling, 
this will serve as a signal for the beit din (rabbinical court) to institute non-market rationing schemes. 
Furthermore, this mechanism is to be coupled with the communal institution of wage and price controls (Levine 
2012: 108, 111), which may conflict with and supersede the hayyei nefesh ordinance (Levine 2012: 108). The 
purpose of these controls is to eliminate economic rents and profits (1985a: 423; 1985b: 448f.; 2012: 109, 112).
But there are a few problems with Levine's interpretation: first, in Levine's interpretation, there is still a 
system of price-controls, only the price which is enforced is not the official price declared by the beit din, but 
rather the supposed competitive market rate. In other words, there is a sort of terminological dispute about what 
to call the price that is enforced, but there is still some price that is enforced. The entire purpose of Levine's 
interpretation was to deny that the Talmud imposed price-controls, for he admitted that price-controls are self-
defeating (Levine 2012: 22, 93-95, 110). But after all his efforts, his interpretation still results in there being a 
price-control, only the price that is enforced is not the official price promulgated by the courts, but rather the 
price which the courts perceive to be the market price. Either way, a price-control is still being enforced. A price-
control is still a price-control regardless of whether the price that is enforced is an officially promulgated price or 
whether it is the preexisting status quo market price from which future deviations are prohibited. If deviations 
from the status quo market price are prohibited, then this still constitutes a price-control with all its attendant 
negative effects. If the equilibrium market-clearing price changes but the status quo market price continues to be 
enforced, then the market will be unable to clear, and there will be economic misallocations and dislocations. 
Furthermore, in his interpretation, once the market price rises to equal the official price, at that point, the court is 
supposed to institute non-price-rationing, which means there is still a price-control. Furthermore, Levine says 
that all this is to be coupled with communal wage and price controls. So all Levine has done is to replace one 
form of price-control with another.
Second, it is difficult to understand how the market price could ever rise to meet the official price-ceiling 
if the commissioners punish every deviation from the market price. How are prices to rise if sellers are bound by 
the status quo market prices?64 As we noted, enforcement of the status quo market price is still a price-control. 
Suppose the market price is today $10 and the official price-ceiling is $20 (following Levine's interpretation that 
the two differ). When the market price rises to $20, Levine would say, this would serve as a signal to the court to 
take remedial action, including rationing (Levine 2012: 107).65 But how is the market price to rise from $10 to 
$20 if the first merchant to charge $12 (deviating more than one-sixth from $10) is immediately punished and 
forced to sell at $11 (within one-sixth)? If every significant deviation from the market price is immediately 
prevented, how will the market price ever change? Perhaps Levine assumes the price will change only gradually, 
from $10 to $11 to $12, etc., $1 at a time, until it finally reaches $20, instead of going straight from $10 to $20. 
Starting with a price of $10, then one may charge $11.67, i.e. 1/6 more than $10. Then, when $11.67 has become 
the new general price-level, one may charge 1/6 more than that, or $13.60. This process will continue until one 
finally reaches $20, the efficient market-clearing price which was desired all along. But if an increase from $10 
to $20 is necessary to achieve market-clearing equilibrium, then the last thing we want is to delay that transition 
by forcing it to be gradual, compelling the price-transition to proceed by proportions of 1/6. The faster the 
transition is made, the less painful it will be and the fewer economic disruptions and dislocations it will cause. If 
the current market price is $10 and some alert entrepreneur realizes that the market will clear only at $20, then 
we want him to be able to immediately charge $20. We do not want him to have to first charge $11.67, then wait 
until all his competitors charge $11.67 too (so that $11.67 becomes the new market price), and then charge 
$13.60, etc., repeating this tedious process until $20. There appears to be no theoretical economic reason why 
such a gradual transition would be desirable.
Nor did Levine ever indicate that he had such a gradual transition in mind in his statement that the price-
level would be permitted to change even as deviations from it were simultaneously prohibited. Instead, it appears 
more likely that Levine relied on a static-equilibrium conception of price theory, whereby the general market rate 
of prices changes according to the actions of a mythical Walrasian auctioneer without any individual market 
participant ever having changed his own prices. If every market participant is a price-taker rather than a price-
setter, then no market participant can be responsible for changing the general price-level. But then who did 
change the price-level? Apparently, according to the static conception, the price changed itself without any 
human input. But according to theory of the market as a “process” (Kirzner 1997, following Mises), the general 
price-level can change only as a result of individual market participants changing their prices. The general price 
level will change from $10 to $20 when merchants individually change the prices they charge, in response to 
individually changing perceptions of relative supply and demand by different market participants.
If the Talmud assumed a static-equilibrium model of a general price-level that changes without any 
individual market participants changing their prices, then hafka'at she'arim would definitely be a price-control – 
contrary to Levine's interpretation – for the court commissioners would have to ban every deviation from the 
market price by individual merchants and thus prevent the price from ever changing. It is meaningless to allow 
the general price-level to change if every individual merchant is forbidden to alter the prices he charges. Levine's 
attempt to show that hafka'at she'arim is not a price-control will have failed. At best, prices would be permitted 
to change only gradually, in the manner which we have indicated, from $10 to $11.67 to $13.60, but without 
passing directly from $10 to the market-clearing rate of $20. Interpreted in this way, hafka'at she'arim would not 
constitute a pure price-control, but it would nevertheless put a brake on economic adjustments and unnecessarily 
prolong the agony of economic disequilibrium. But if the Talmud understood the market as a “process,” as with 
Mises and Kirzner, then the Talmud would have understood that the general price-level changes if and only if 
individual merchants change their prices. In that case, allowing the general price-level to change necessarily 
presumes that merchants have full freedom to charge whatever prices they wish. Therefore, the Talmud could not 
have intended what Levine argues it did, namely that the commissioners were to ban individual merchants from 
deviating from the market price at the same time that the general price-level was to be allowed to somehow 
fluctuate until it reached the official price. Either the Talmud assumed that the market is a dynamic process, and 
Levine's interpretation of the Talmud is untenable; or else the Talmud assumed static-equilibrium, and hafka'at 
she'arim is indeed a price-control, contrary to Levine's intended aim. Or it is possible that the purpose of the law 
was to prolong economic adjustment by forcing price changes to be unnecessarily gradual and step-wise, in 
which case Levine has failed once again to prove hafka'at she'arim is not a price-control.
Interestingly, Levine assumes that the law of hafka'at she'arim as recorded in the codes of Jewish law no 
longer applies, but he never specifies the legal mechanism by which this law has been annulled. He states (2012: 
109, 112):66
What survives is not the 20% figure per se. This figure made sense only for the marketplace and 
economic conditions that existed at the time of the enactment of the ordinance. The general 
objection to “excessive profits” for those who deal in essential products should, however, 
remain. What should be substituted for the 20% figure today is the notion that the ideal is to 
craft government tax and regulatory policy to eliminate economic rents in the hayyei nefesh 
[essential foodstuffs] sector. In other words, the goal should be to prevent profits in this sector 
from exceeding opportunity cost earnings.67
Unfortunately, Levine's scheme of taxing profits above opportunity costs to eliminate rents is not any better than 
the original price-control which he sought to avoid. As we showed earlier, profits and losses are essential signals 
to investors and producers. Profits motivate new entry while losses inspire exit. Taxing excess profits would 
therefore deter new entry, as Levine himself says (2012: 94). For example, if a famine has struck a land and the 
price of food has skyrocketed, the excess profits will encourage foreign suppliers to divert their food supply 
from their own domestic market where profits are normal, to the famine-stricken market where profits are 
excess. If suppliers are forbidden to earn higher profits in the famine-stricken market than in their own local 
market, then they will have no incentive to export supplies to alleviate the famine. Levine's scheme of taxing 
excess profits would thus disrupt the price-mechanism and create disorder in the market, just like any other 
price-control. Levine's error is especially puzzling because he himself correctly pointed out how essential profits 
are for coordination and signaling (Levine 2012: 94) and that price-controls are therefore self-defeating (Levine 
2012: 110). Hence, it is not clear why Levine considers it desirable to eliminate profits. Perhaps it is because in 
Neoclassical static-equilibrium analysis, “above-normal profit is taken as an indicator of monopoly, and 
evidence of an inefficient allocation of resources” (Holcombe 2014: 388; cf. DiLorenzo 1988: 321f. and Pasour 
1987: 124-126). But if so, then as Randall G. Holcombe has recently pointed out (2014: 390, 400), 
profit is a sign of increased efficiency in the allocation of resources, not a sign of inefficiency. 
Consider this even within a comparative static framework. If one starts with the situation in 
which all markets are in equilibrium and there are no economic profits, and then an entrepreneur 
introduces an innovation into the market that generates economic profits, that profit will be the 
result of either an innovation that lowers the cost of production of the entrepreneur’s output, or 
produces a good or service that purchasers value more than the alternatives previously available. 
Either way, the profit is an indication that resources are being allocated more efficiently than 
before, and welfare has increased. . . . Above-normal profits indicate a welfare loss within a 
static framework, because using competitive equilibrium as a benchmark for efficiency, the firm 
making above-normal profit is doing so by producing an inefficiently low quantity to maintain 
that profit. However, when profit is the result of innovation, a competitive industry is the wrong 
benchmark, because the output would not have been produced were it not for the lure of future 
profit. 
In general, profits are a signal and an incentive for entrepreneurs to cut costs and introduce innovations which 
will benefit consumers (Holcombe 2014, Coyne and Coyne 2015b: 9-12.). Therefore, eliminating profits will 
remove the incentive for innovation and cost-cutting. Furthermore, Holcombe (2014: 389) asks us to
Consider the factors that actually have led to an increase in welfare in the context of neoclassical 
welfare economics. Would anyone argue that the reason people are better off today than they 
were a century ago, or two decades ago, is because the economy is closer to a Pareto optimal 
allocation of resources now? Welfare has increased because of economic progress, and the 
Pareto optimal allocation of resources that lies at the foundation of welfare economics is almost 
irrelevant to the factors that have actually led to increases in welfare. The static efficiency of 
Pareto optimality has little relationship to actual economic welfare, and its corollary that welfare 
maximization requires the economic profit be eliminated has very little relevance to actual 
economic welfare. Actual improvements in welfare are the result of economic progress, not 
moving closer to a Pareto optimal allocation of resources. 
Therefore, it is not clear why we would want to eliminate economic rents and tax excess profits, as Levine 
counsels us. Perhaps what Levine meant is that excess profits should be taxed only in the case of monopoly (cf. 
Levine 2012: 95) but not in the case of above-normal returns for successful entrepreneurship and innovation. If 
so, then this would bring us into the field of the theory of monopoly, which is beyond this article's scope.68 In any 
case, whereas Levine attempted to show that hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh does not constitute a price-control, 
nevertheless, every one of his interpretations ultimately reduces to some form of price-control or another.
IX. Are these Laws Still in Force?
We have now seen that while ona'ah is not a price-control, enforcement of hafka'at she'arim / hayyei 
nefesh and the restrictions on middlemen and speculation would be self-defeating like all price-controls. 
Likewise, there is no doubt that the community's power to democratically impose wage and price controls would 
be economically self-defeating as well and produce unremittingly negative consequences.
The question is, what if anything can be done about all this? As we already saw, the prohibition of 
ona'ah is no longer legally binding because there is no such thing as the “true” price of a good (Shilo and Elon 
2008; Warhaftig 1988: sec. “G. Contemporary Application”, end of sec. “C. Exceptions”). Perhaps the same 
applies to the law of hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh as well, which also prohibits deviations of 1/6 from the 
price. If ona'ah cannot be enforced because there is no such thing as a “true” price from which deviations of 1/6 
are prohibited, then the same ought to be true of hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh. Indeed, we saw that Aaron 
Levine states (2012: 109, 112) that “What survives is not the 20% figure per se. This figure made sense only for 
the marketplace and economic conditions that existed at the time of the enactment of the ordinance.”
However, this would not account for communally-imposed price-controls nor the restrictions on 
speculation and middlemen. Because these laws have no reference to the 1/6 fraction with respect to the “true” 
price of a good, we cannot say that these laws are no longer binding on that account. And Isidore Epstein looks 
forward to the implementation of these laws in the modern State of Israel with great satisfaction and delight, 
saying of the Talmudic rabbis and their social legislation that (1962: xii)
in what they accomplished they not only anticipated much that is best in the social ethics of 
modern civilization, but what is more, have provided the Jewish state of the future with valuable 
material for setting up on earth a Kingdom of G-d.
Thus, it appears too soon to pronounce this set of laws to be of merely antiquarian interest. We must assume that 
many of these halakhic economic regulations are alive and well. If they conflict with modern economic theory, 
then this constitutes a serious political and religious problem. Furthermore, it is unfortunate that we cannot 
assume that the Jewish religious courts (batei din) will be populated by judges who are familiar with modern 
economic theory. What then, should we do when Jewish law and economic theory conflict?
X. Changing Halakhah (Jewish Law) in Response to Scientific Discoveries
But in asking what to do when there is a conflict between economic theory and the halakhah, we must 
first ask whether the traditionally-observant Jew can even admit the premise of this question. Is it even possible 
for the halakhah to be wrong? This allegation, that certain Talmudic economic regulations are self-defeating, 
will obviously be disconcerting and even threatening to traditional Jews. After all, the claim is that their 
traditional literature and laws are simply wrong. It is possible that traditional Jews might stubbornly and proudly 
respond that no, if economic science contradicts the halakhah, then the economic science must be wrong, for a 
sacred religious tradition cannot be wrong. But is this really the only possible response the traditional Jew can 
give?
In fact, no, rejection of science in favor of the claims of the religious tradition is not the only option the 
traditional Jew has, for there exists in the traditional Jewish literature an alternative which grants more credence 
to science. Long ago, the post-Talmudic rabbis realized that the medicine of the Talmud contradicted their own 
post-Talmudic medical science. The 10th-century Babylonian rabbi, Sherira Gaon, wrote,69
We must tell you that our Rabbis were not physicians. They merely said what they observed 
among patients here and there. These are not commandments [which must be obeyed]. 
Therefore, do not rely on these cures [in the Talmud]. 
Yehuda Levi comments on this passage (2006 [1983]: 223),
Thus Rav Sherira Gaon did not consider our Sages' statements regarding medicine to be an 
integral part of the Oral Torah, but rather simply advice based on their own experience.
This is why no one has ever heard of an Orthodox Jew objecting to the education taught in medical schools 
today, even though it contradicts the medicine taught in the Talmud: because the medicine of the Talmud is not 
considered part of the Sinaitic tradition, but rather as something the Talmudic Rabbis determined by their own 
study and observation as ordinary human scientists. Therefore, the traditional Jew has no compunction against 
disregarding the Talmud's medicine in favor of modern medicine. 
In fact, according to one story told by the Talmud, the Rabbis themselves admitted that they were 
incorrect in a matter of astronomy, and that the view of the gentile astronomers was to be preferred (Pesahim 
94b).70 Therefore, Maimonides wrote,71
Do not ask of me that all [that the Sages] mentioned on the subject of astronomy be compatible 
with the facts of the matter, because academic knowledge at that time was deficient. They did 
not speak of these matters as a tradition from the Prophets, but rather because they were the 
scholars of that generation in these matters, or because they learned them from the scholars of 
the era.
Likewise, Maimonides's son, Rabbi Avraham ben ha-Rambam, wrote in his famous introduction to the Ein 
Yaakov that (Glick 1916: vii)72
[W]e are not in duty bound to defend the opinions of the sages of the Talmud, concerning 
medicine, physics and astrology, as right in every respect simply because we know the sages to 
be great men with a full knowledge of all things regarding the Torah, in its various details. 
Although it is true that in so far as knowledge of our Torah is concerned, we must believe the 
sages arrived at the highest stage of knowledge, as it is said, 'In accordance with the instructions 
which they may instruct thee,' etc. (Deut. 17:11), still it is not necessarily so concerning any 
other branch of knowledge. ... [T]hey did not arrive at the true ultimate conclusion of everything 
outside of the Torah.
Citing the gaonim (the rabbis of the era immediately following the completion of the Talmud), the 19th-century 
German rabbi, Samson Raphael Hirsch wrote in a private letter (teshuva),73
The primary approach which should be kept in mind by anyone who studies the words of the 
Sages is this: our Sages were scholars of the G-dly faith, the recipients and transmitters and 
instructors of its teachings, its laws, its commandments, and rules. They were not especially 
expert in science, mathematics, astronomy, and medicine – only to the extent necessary for 
knowledge, observance, and performance of the Torah. We do not find that this [scientific] 
information was transmitted to them from Sinai.... Their great [scholars] were proficient in all 
fields of knowledge and the sciences in keeping with the accepted truths of their times, and they 
were equal in this realm of knowledge and science to all the other great scholars in other nations, 
whose wisdom and teachings were accepted as well-known in their generation...
Dayan Meyer S. Lew says briefly that the rabbis of the Talmud “had knowledge of scientific subjects as known 
in their time” (1985: 3), and Rabbi Gil Student (2001) considers it to be elementary that
Moshe did not receive scientific knowledge at Sinai and that science was not transmitted 
throughout the ages to the great rabbis. ... If the sages did not receive all of science from Sinai, 
then from where did they gain their scientific knowledge? As we have discussed elsewhere, the 
talmudic rabbis were keen observers of the world and performed experiments to better 
understand reality (e.g. Chullin 45b, 57b). Additionally, they consulted with scientists of their 
time. Aside from explicit mentions of consultations with doctors in the Talmud (e.g. Chullin 
77a), there are many striking similarities between Greek and Roman science on the one hand 
and talmudic science on the other. While it is certainly possible that Aristotle and the rabbis 
arrived at certain identical conclusions independently, it is very likely that some rabbis were 
either familiar themselves with Greek and Roman science or consulted with doctors who were. 
… There is nothing heretical in respectfully saying that some sages were incorrect in regard to 
some scientific facts. 
Meanwhile, Rabbi Marc D. Angel (2008: 16) quotes the late Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv, Haim David Halevy, as 
writing (Asei Lekha Rav 5:49),
If it becomes clear through precise scientific method that a specific idea expressed by our sages 
is not entirely correct, this does not mar their greatness, Heaven forbid, and their greatness as 
sages of Torah. Their words relating to Torah were stated with the power of the holiness of Torah 
with a kind of divine inspiration; but their other words on general topics were stated from the 
depth of their human wisdom only.
Finally, Rabbi Hershel Schacter, rosh yeshivah (rabbinical dean) at Yeshiva University's Rabbi Isaac Elchanan 
Theological Seminary forthrightly declares (2014: 50) the Rabbis of the Talmud
clearly also relied on on the scientists of their time, as we all do. Sometimes this means that they 
relied on what was later discovered to be the scientific mistakes of their time.
Therefore, we propose that just as the Talmudic rabbis did not receive medical knowledge from Sinai, 
but rather used the accepted medical science of their day to interpret the relevant Torah laws, so too, we should 
say that the Talmudic rabbis accepted the economic science of their day and used it to interpret the Torah. Why 
should medical science and economic science be considered fundamentally different? Of course, modern 
economic science is not necessarily accurate, and it could very well be that Talmudic economic science was 
more correct than modern economic science. But the traditional Jew should at least admit the possibility that just 
as the Talmudic rabbis relied on the medical science of their day and did not speak on medical matters from 
Sinaitic tradition, the same could be true of economics as well.
But even if it were admitted that Talmudic economic understanding is mistaken, the question would still 
remain whether the halakhah may be changed in light of the new scientific understanding. There is the serious 
danger that changing the halakhah whenever it contradicts science, will end up disrupting Judaism as a whole 
and create religious and legal chaos. As Rabbi Gil Student warns (2001), following the Medieval Sefer ha-
Hinukh,
Even if the sages were mistaken on certain scientific facts, the overall corpus of rabbinic 
literature must still remain the basis of Judaism. It is better to tolerate a few errors than to 
encourage religious chaos. As we will see, some take this approach in regard to every single 
halakhah and will never allow changing an halakhah based on modern science. Others are more 
willing to change some halakhot. However, the suggestion that since the rabbis did not have 
access to modern science we must reject their entire world view is both over-reactive and 
impractical. That would destroy the Jewish religion and the Jewish people.
Therefore, we must tread lightly and carefully. Still, there are occasions when changing the halakhah is 
warranted in light of new scientific developments, and Rabbi Gil Student has encyclopedically catalogued 
(2001) a variety of different responses which various rabbis have historically made in light of new scientific 
developments which contradicted the halakhah. One response is simply not to change the halakhah at all, and 
there are two different justifications for this approach. One way is to say that unfortunately, the halakhah became 
fixed with the writing of the Talmud and that today's rabbis simply lack the authority to change the halakhah in 
the way which the rabbis of the Talmud could have.74 Another is to be skeptical that modern science is really 
trustworthy at all.75 
However, Student says, there is another historical approach, which has been to indeed change the 
halakhah when it contradicts new scientific discoveries. According to him (2001),
Another possible response is to advocate changing halakhah whenever it seems to contradict 
science. This can come from two different understandings. The first is simply that the sages of 
different generations did not have any special understanding of science. Rather, they knew the 
science of their times and occasionally erred alongside the leading scientists of their generations. 
Others would argue the exact opposite. The rabbis had divine assistance in understanding 
scientific reality. If so, how can contemporary science disagree with he sages' perception of 
reality? Evidently, reality has changed. Whether it is due to changes in climate, diet, exercise 
patterns, or even what some term “micro-evolution”, nature has changed and the scientific facts 
of 1500 to 2000 years ago are sometimes different from what we observe today. Therefore, it is 
not that halakhah changes but that it must relate to a new reality.
But whether it is scientific knowledge which has changed – meaning that the Talmudic rabbis were in error – or 
whether it is scientific reality which has been altered – meaning that the Talmudic rabbis were correct in their 
day on matters of scientific fact, but that the scientific nature of reality has changed since then – the practical 
consequence is the same, that the halakhah should be changed accordingly.
However, there is also a third possibility raised by Student (2001). This response is “much more nuanced 
[and a]ccording to this view, science is used by the sages in two ways.” Sometimes, Student says, the scientific 
knowledge of the Talmudic rabbis was itself a source for legislation. But at other times, he says, “the sages used 
science is to explain a received tradition or an observed phenomenon”. In other words, the rabbis already had a 
tradition that such-and-such was the law, and they used their scientific knowledge to justify a law which was 
already in existence. This distinction has important consequences for what to do when the halakhah contradicts 
new scientific developments, as Student explains (2001):
These two uses of science by the Talmudic rabbis lead to different reactions when the science is 
revised. In the first case, when the halakhah is based on the science, once the understanding of 
reality is changed the halakhah must be as well. … However, in the second type, science was 
only used to explain the halakhah. If the science is shown to be incorrect, the halakhah should 
not be changed. Rather, a new explanation should be sought to explain the halakhah.76
Yehudah Levi makes a similar distinction saying (2006 [1983]: 228),
The answer to this question [of whether the halakhah must be changed in the light of new 
scientific developments] evidently depends on the basis of the halakhah: if the halakhah has 
been handed down from Mt. Sinai, it will not be affected by scientific discovery; on the other 
hand, if it is explicitly based on the presumed facts, determining these facts will affect the 
halakhah.
With all this said, there remains a strong, hallowed tradition in Jewish law which allows halakhah 
(Jewish law) to change in response to scientific discoveries. Hershel Schachter (2014: 50) is cautiously 
permissive, stating,77
we shouldn't rush to change the halakhah because scientists can change their minds. Halakhah 
needs to be around for a long time. But if many years pass and something is accepted as a 
scientific fact [which contradicts halakhah], then we need to reconsider the halakhah.78
Schachter concludes (2014: 50),79
if there is a halakhah that is clearly based on a [scientific] mistake, that you cannot interpret 
differently, and is outright incorrect, how can you continue observing it? It's based on a mistake. 
We believe in Torah min HaShamayim {lit. “Torah from the heavens”} – it's a Divine code. If 
there is a mistake, it's a man-made mistake. HaKadosh Baruch Hu {lit. “the Holy One, Blessed 
be He”} doesn't make mistakes.
XI. Changing the Jewish Price-Controls in Response to Discoveries in Economics
Now that we have established the fact that the traditional Jew can admit that halakhah is sometimes 
mistaken when it disagrees with modern science, we must ask again: what can we do about the economic 
regulations in particular? As we have seen, ona'ah is relatively easy to account for: the prohibition does not 
apply where the buyer and seller make a suitable stipulation to waive it. Furthermore, the prohibition does not 
even apply in the first place where goods and prices are heterogeneous, which is certainly the case today. It 
seems that the law of ona'ah is probably no longer legally authoritative, and even if it is, it is easily 
circumvented.
But hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh is more difficult, because the halakhah is explicit that it cannot be 
waived. Nevertheless, it is possible to say that just as ona'ah is no longer legally binding because there is no 
“true” price to enforce, so too with hafka'at she'arim. This is made easier by the fact that whereas ona'ah is a 
Torah-prohibition, hafka'at she'arim is merely Rabbinic (Elon 2008, Warhaftig 1988: sec. “F. Fraud...”). 
Rabbinic laws are considered to carry less authority than Torah laws, and so nullifying a Rabbinic law is easier 
than nullifying a Torah law. If it is possible to deem the prohibition of ona'ah to no longer apply, then a fortiori 
the same is true of hafka'at she'arim. Thus we can say: the laws of ona'ah and hafka'at she'arim applied only in 
the past, when there (allegedly) existed a uniform market price. But now that such thing certainly does not exist 
anymore, the law of ona'ah and hafka'at she'arim are null-and-void. The rabbinical courts could announce that 
“nature has changed” (cf. Student 2001, Levi 2006 [1983]: 221f.) and that while the laws of ona'ah and hafka'at 
she'arim used to apply to homogeneous goods, they no longer apply to a modern economy where goods are 
heterogeneous, not to mention where there are e.g. different methods of packaging and financing and differing 
qualities of storefront ambiance and customer service. As Aaron Levine says (2012: 109, 112), “What survives is 
not the 20% figure per se. This figure made sense only for the marketplace and economic conditions that existed 
at the time of the enactment of the ordinance.” And as we saw Warhaftig says (1988: end of sec. “C. 
Exceptions”) that “in most cases today it is impossible to establish a market price.” Furthermore, he states (ibid. 
s.v. “G. Contemporary Applications”) that “in a completely free market, where every merchant has his own 
price[, t]here is is no market price, and therefore no ona'ah.” And as we noted, Menachem Elon argues similarly 
(Shilo and Elon 2008). And if the nonexistence of a “true” price nullifies the prohibition of ona'ah, the same 
ought to be true of hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh.
Alternatively, it may be possible to annul the Rabbinic law of hafka'at she'arim by asserting that that 
Rabbinic law was enacted on the basis of a misunderstanding of economic science. Because hafka'at she'arim is 
acknowledged to be Rabbinic in status, it is feasible for us to simply declare that the Rabbis spoke on the basis 
of mistaken economic science. The limitation of profits with respect to costs is annulled because the law was 
created by humans (the Rabbis) on the basis of a mistaken understanding of science. This approach would be 
especially applicable for annulling the restrictions placed on speculators and middlemen. Because those laws do 
not make reference to the “true” market price or the 1/6 fraction, we cannot say that those laws were formulated 
for conditions of homogeneous goods and prices which no longer hold. In other words, the “nature has changed” 
argument does not suffice. Instead, we must say that those laws were based on a mistaken understanding of 
economics. The same applies to the community's power to impose wage and price controls; we must say this was 
simply mistaken.
And there is one more candidate for a possible means by which to circumvent hafka'at she'arim: 
according to Menachem Elon (2008), “the rules concerning profiteering were only to take effect if imposed as 
measures of general application to all vendors, otherwise the individual could not be obliged to adhere to the 
permitted maximum rate of profit.” Similarly, according to Itamar Warhaftig (1987: end of sec. “4. Profit 
Limitation”), “a merchant is obligated to abide by this law only if there is a supervisory mechanism to insure that 
all merchants conform to its provisions. If, however, the market is unregulated one does not have to sell cheaper 
than others.” The idea seems to be that a merchant does not have to hamstring himself by abiding by these laws 
if his competitors are not. If any part of the market is unregulated, then the merchants in the regulated sector are 
not obligated to abide by the regulations either, lest they face competitive disadvantage. But in this era of 
globalization, the relevant market seems to be the world market as opposed to the local or even domestic market. 
Therefore, it would not be enough to enforce ona'ah and hafka'at she'arim in the land of Israel, because the 
inhabitants of the rest of the world remain unregulated. If these laws were enforced in Israel, then domestic 
Israeli commerce would face international competitive disadvantage. And as long as the rest of the world is not 
regulated by the Talmud's laws, then the market per se is not regulated by the Talmud either. Since the relevant 
market today is the world market, then the whole world must be regulated by the Talmud's laws in order for the 
Talmud's economic regulations to be binding for Jews in Israel. Since the non-Jewish world does not enforce 
these halakhic regulations, therefore, it is possible that no Jew is obligated to abide by them either. In an era of 
global trade, domestic interventionist regulations are liable to backfire even worse than in a closed domestic 
economy. In fact, according to some scholars, restrictions on international trade and attempts to insulate the 
domestic market from foreign competition were contributory causes to the outbreaks of WWI and WWII (Mises 
[1919] 1983, [1944] 1985: esp. chapter 3, parts 4-10; Cassel 1934).80 Aside from this, tariffs and other forms of 
protectionism lead to monopoly and reduced consumer welfare. Therefore, the State of Israel should not restrict 
international trade. Fostering competitive international trade requires that the State of Israel and the religious 
Jewish courts (batei din) not enforce the Talmud's regulations, lest Israeli merchants face competitive 
disadvantage from foreigners who are not so restricted. 
Finally, as for the corporate community's power to impose wage and price controls, this appears happily 
to be moribund and in desuetude, simply because modern Jewish communities are not constituted as they once 
were, to be independent politically authoritative bodies (Menachem Friedman 1982, 1986, 1993, 2004; cf. 
Tamari 1991: 15). Today, any given locale where Orthodox Jews live, tends to have a multiplicity of competing 
rabbis and rabbinical courts, and none of them has the sort of territorial monopoly on the legitimate use of force 
which would be necessary to impose wage and price controls. Therefore, they simply do not have the political 
authority necessary. Furthermore, the communities are so localized that it is likely that any attempt to impose the 
controls would become a self-evident failure. Imagine, for example, a synagogue in New York City attempting to 
dictate that every one of its congregants must pay half the going rate for food and must work for at least double 
the going rate of wages. This synagogue's members would immediately find themselves unable to purchase food 
or find employment in a competitive marketplace. Any Orthodox Jew who told the local supermarket that he is 
only allowed to pay half the going rate for food, or who told his employer that he must be paid double the going 
wage-rate for his occupation, would be laughed at, and it is unlikely that any synagogue would attempt to 
enforce such a decree. If the synagogue tried, the congregants would probably all vote with their feet and begin 
attending a synagogue which allowed them to purchase food and to find employment at the going market rates. 
Therefore, the communal price-controls are probably of no concern whatsoever in a modern world. Nevertheless, 
we should admit that once upon a time, when the Jewish communities were authoritative, the imposition of wage 
and price controls was politically possible and yet economically self-defeating. The communal controls may lie 
in desuetude today, but we should admit that when they were effective, they were based on erroneous economic 
science. If it ever becomes politically feasible to enforce these communal price-controls again, we should be 
ready to renounce and denounce that power immediately.
But ultimately, what is important for our present purposes is not how the halakhic price-controls may be 
circumvented, but only whether they should be circumvented. Once it is admitted that the halakhah and science 
in general may contradict, and that halakhic price-controls may conflict with economic theory in particular, then 
it follows that any legitimate means of altering the halakhah should be used. This present essay does not aim at 
definitively establishing what are the halakhically legitimate means of bringing halakhah into reconciliation with 
science, for that is a matter best left with scholars of the halakhah. Instead, this essay wishes only to reveal that 
the conflict exists and point out the desideratum for some means of reconciliation, whatever it may be. As a 
model, we might take the example of how halakhah has dealt with the Biblical prohibition of charging interest. 
When the Biblical prohibition of charging interest became too much of an impediment to the needs of modern 
commerce, the rabbis formulated the heter iska to circumvent that prohibition (Epstein 1962: 43f.). What 
concerns us here is not how the heter iska works (see Tamari 1987:159-208, Tamari 1991: 103-127), but only 
that it does work, and that the heter iska was devised consciously as a means of adapting the halakhah when it 
conflicted with the needs of life. The rabbis knew that enforcing the Biblical ban on interest would prove 
disastrous to economic life and welfare, and so they found a halakhically legitimate means of circumventing that 
ban. The same could be said of the prozbul, invented by the rabbi Hillel to circumvent the annulment of debts 
during the shemittah (Sabbatical) year. With the coming of the year of the annulment of debts, Hillel was afraid 
that the poor would find no one to loan to them, and he considered it better that they be required to repay their 
loans than that they find themselves without any loans at all, and therefore, he invented the means by which the 
annulment of debts is itself prevented (Epstein 1962: vii; Lew 1985: 45-47). Once again, it does not matter for 
our purposes how the prozbul works, only that it does, and that it was definitely motivated by the perception of a 
conflict between the halakhah and the economic needs of modern life. This essay proposes that the various 
halakhic economic regulations should be approached similarly to the matter of interest, and that these various 
halakhic economic regulations be circumvented in a manner similar to the heter iska and the prozbul.
Of course, it is possible that after all, the Talmudic economic regulations really are effective and 
efficient, and it is modern economic science that is in error. But the religious Jewish community should at least 
admit the possibility that enforcement of these halakhot would be self-defeating. Just as they say that the 
Talmudic rabbis received their knowledge of medical science from their own empirical study and from the 
studies of their gentile neighbors, and not from Sinaitic tradition, so too, they should admit at least the 
theoretical possibility that the same is true of Talmudic economic science. They should prepare contingency 
plans for each case: if the halakhah is correct and modern economic theory is wrong, then nothing need be done. 
But if economic theory is correct and the halakhah is wrong, they should be prepared to say that economic 
science was not received at Sinai, and that therefore, the halakhah should be changed in whatever manner is 
halakhically legitimate. Once they have accounted for both of these two possibilities, then they need no longer 
fear what the outcome of scientific studies will be, because either way, they will have already formulated a 
religiously legitimate response. This procedure was advocated by Rabbi Avraham Yitzhaq Kook, the late Chief 
Rabbi of Mandate Palestine, who wrote (Igrot 134, trans. in Feldman 1986: 11f, 14.),
When we accept this view, we no longer have any particular need to fight against the 
descriptions that have gained fame among the new researchers, and having become unbiased in 
the matter we will be able to judge fairly, and now we will be able to refute peacefully their 
conclusions as much as truth will show the way. … And in general, this is an important rule in 
the struggle of ideas: we should not immediately refute any idea which comes to contradict 
anything in the Torah, but rather, we should build the palace of Torah above it; in doing so we 
are exalted by the Torah, and through this exaltation the ideas are revealed, and thereafter, when 
we are not pressured by anything, we can confidently also struggle against it.
By preparing two contingency plans, one for in case the Talmud is right and one in case it is wrong, the religious 
Jewish community can be dispassionate in its studies for it need no longer fear that scientific study will upset 
religious faith.
XII. Conclusion
Thus, we have seen that the halakhah's economic regulations, like all forms of price-control, would tend 
to be inefficient if enforced and would tend to accomplish the very opposite of their intention. While ona'ah may 
have only been intended to protect against asymmetric information, the hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh 
ordinance definitely constitutes a price-control on essential foodstuffs. Furthermore, there appears to be nobody 
who argues that the Talmud's condemnation and restriction of middlemen and speculators were anything other 
than what they appear to be. And the community's power to impose wage and price controls cannot be explained 
anyway as being anything else. 
But it may be the case that the laws of ona'ah and hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh are no longer 
applicable to a modern marketplace, and therefore, they are no cause for concern. If so, then the matter may rest 
there. But furthermore, traditional Orthodox Jews should have the courage to admit that the Talmudic rabbis did 
not receive science – including economic theory – at Sinai and that these Talmudic economic regulations may 
conflict with modern economic theory and the needs of modern life. Orthodox Jews today should have the 
courage to apply to the Talmudic price-controls what Maimonides said in his “Letter on Astrology” about the 
Talmud's expressions of belief in astrology (Maimonides 1972: 472):
I know that you may search and find sayings of some individual sages in the Talmud and 
Midrashim whose words appear to maintain that at the moment of a man's birth, the stars will 
cause such and such to happen to him. Do not regard this as a difficulty, for it is … not proper to 
abandon matters of reason that have already been verified by proofs, shake loose of them, and 
depend on the words of a single one of the sages from whom possibly the matter was hidden. … 
A man should never cast his reason behind him, for the eyes are set in front, not in back.
Furthermore, the Orthodox Jew should be prepared to admit – if necessary – that these laws ought to be 
somehow circumvented in roughly the same way that the iska permitted taking interest and the prozbul 
prevented the nullification of debts in the shemittah (Sabbatical) year. 
At the very least, Orthodox Jews should prepare this sort of response which we have proposed and 
reconcile themselves to it as an acceptable possibility in case this response ever becomes necessary. By 
preparing such a contingency plan – what Rav Kook called “building a palace of Torah” – the Orthodox Jew is 
prepared for all eventualities. Whatever the conclusions of critical analysis and scientific study may be, he has a 
religiously acceptable response prepared. He no longer need fear the results of critical research and he will not 
feel compelled to respond in a knee-jerk fashion to findings which appear to contradict his religion. If the 
science is wrong, then his religion is fine; but if the science turns out to be correct, he has already prepared a 
religiously acceptable response in advance, just in case. Even if it should happily turn out that the Talmud's 
economic legislation is perfectly sound, the Orthodox Jew will already have been comfortably prepared for the 
contrary contingency.
And we have provided another example of the possibility of distinguishing between the core of an 
ethical theory and the non-essential scientific assumptions presumed by that theory. Just as it was possible to 
reconcile Aristotelian virtue ethics (eudaimonism) with business by abandoning Aristotle's non-essential views 
on economic theory (Miller 2013), so too, we will have distinguished between what was received at Sinai and 
the science with the Talmudic rabbis learned through their own personal study as human beings. Meanwhile, we 
have shown that the possibility of conflict between religion and science exists not only in the fields of 
cosmology and biology/evolution (Slifkin 2006), but also in the field of economics. Such conflicts in matters of 
the economy should be dealt with in the same manner as conflicts between science and the first chapter of 
Genesis. Finally, it is not enough to state that a given religion is generally in favor of a given economic system; 
one must instead subject the laws and regulations of that religion to detailed individual analysis.
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organization of Hil. Mekhira. In Hil. Mekhira chaps. 12 and 13, Maimonides discusses ona'ah. In the first two 
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hoarding, communal price-controls, and guilds. In the final paragraphs of chap. 14, i.e. par. 12-18, Maimonides returns 
to the topic of ona'ah. In other words, hafka'at she'arim is sandwiched in between two discussions of ona'ah, showing 
they are related. Meir Tamari's 1991 presentation is similar to Maimonides's in this regard; Tamari (1991: 68-72) first 
discusses hafka'at she'arim, then he turns (1991: 87) to ona'ah, and then he returns to hafka'at she'arim again (1991: 
87f.), which this time he refers to – not entirely accurately – as “cost-related ona'ah.” Finally, he concludes with 
ordinary ona'ah again (1991: 88-91). Elsewhere, Tamari (1987) seems to draw a sharper distinction, separating hafka'at 
she'arim (1987: 88-96) and ona'ah (1987: 96-100) into two separate sections. But even then ,Tamari (1987) briefly 
lumps ona'ah and hafka'at she'arim together into one single statement, saying (1987: 88), “the forms of price control 
discussed here all refer to basic commodities or their ingredients [i.e., hafka'at she'arim], with investment goods (such as 
land, slaves, or monetary instruments) excluded [i.e. ona'ah].” Meyer S. Lew does not clearly distinguish between 
hafka'at she'arim and ona'ah, shifting seamlessly from discussing the former (Lew 1985: 42) to the latter (Lew 1985: 
43) without clearly distinguishing them. Warhaftig (1987) is mostly concerned with hafka'at she'arim while Warhaftig 
(1988) is mostly concerned with ona'ah, although the latter (Warhaftig 1988) returns to hafka'at she'arim near its 
conclusion (s.v. “F. Fraud, Profit Limitation, and Unfair Pressure”). Although Kleiman (1987) is predominately 
concerned with ona'ah, his brief allusion to hafka'at she'arim shows their close relationship: “The rather general, 
contrasting statement to the effect that profits (from trade?) should not exceed one-sixth (TB BB 90a), seems to have 
represented an attempt to interpret the ona'ah rules in an all-embracing manner” (Kleiman 1987: 36 n. 23).
15 Similarly, Warhaftig (1988: sec. “F. Fraud...”) says “Profit limitation is a rabbinic ordinance, whereas ona'ah is of Torah 
status,” and by “profit limitation” he means “the statute of Shmuel (BB 90a) limiting profits to one sixth above costs.” 
Warhaftig continues (1988: sec. “F. Fraud...”), “Profit limitation is an obligation not subject to change through 
stipulation or waiver, unlike ona'ah.” Kleiman (Kleiman 1987: 36 n. 23) makes an opaque distinction between ona'ah 
and hafka'at she'arim.
16 In general, there are two types of laws in Judaism: Torah law (mi'de'oraita) and Rabbinic law (mi'de'rabanan). Rabbinic 
laws are created by the Rabbis as explicit acts of legislation and therefore they have lesser legal authority than Torah 
laws. Torah laws are passed down by tradition as part of the Oral Law – the Torah She'be'al Pe – from Sinai, which was 
delivered by Moses alongside the written Torah – the Torah She'bikhtav. The present author would like to suggest that 
ona'ah may be an example of a very special type of Torah law: the din muflah (“exceptional law”) (Faur 1979-80: 230; 
cf. Maimonides's Introduction to the Mishnah and Introduction to the Mishneh Torah). As we said, there are two types of 
law in Judaism, Torah and Rabbinic. However, dinim mufla'im (pl. of din muflah) fall in between: dinim mufla'im are 
created by Biblical exegesis – midrash halakhah – whenever the Rabbis interpreted the Torah's text on their own. Such 
laws are created by the Rabbis and do not derive from Sinaitic tradition, but they have the legal authority of Torah law 
because they are based on textual reading of the Torah. As ona'ah is based on Lev. 25:19, we suggest that it may be an 
example of din muflah. If this is true, what it would mean is that the law of ona'ah was created by the Rabbis but that it 
has the legal status of a law found in the Torah itself. Meanwhile, hafka'at she'arim is purely Rabbinic. This 
interpretation of ona'ah as a din muflah would lend context to Seth Winslow Weissman's argument (1998: 136-141) that 
the original Biblical law of ona'ah in Lev. 25: 19 was related to the law of the Jubilee, and that ona'ah banned abuse of 
unequal bargaining power in sales of land. Weissman argues that it was only later Rabbinic interpretation which 
transformed ona'ah from a law originally concerning bargaining power and land, into a law about asymmetric 
information and movable property. A simple reading of Weissman would suggest that ona'ah possesses merely Rabbinic 
authority because of its divergence from the Biblical text. But if ona'ah is a din muflah, a law created by the Rabbis 
through Biblical exegesis, then the law would possess Biblical authority because it was not ordained as an act of 
Rabbinic legislation, but it was based on the Rabbinic interpretation of the Bible, giving it Biblical authority. The fact 
that the Rabbinic interpretation of the Bible differs from what we might consider the “correct” interpretation does not 
detract from its authority.
17 Shilo and Elon (2008) and Warhaftig (1988: sec. “C. Exceptions”) cite Talmud, BM 56b; Lew (1995: 43) and Kleiman 
(1987: 30) cite Mishnah, BM 4:9; Tamari (1991: 76) quotes SA HM 228:6.
18 Aaron Levine (2012: 95) notes three different views on which specific types of foodstuffs are price-regulated. Cf. 
Warhaftig (1987: s.v. “2. Products Included”).
19 Warhaftig (1987, s.v. “5. The Market Price”) citing the Rashbam's commentary to Talmud, BB 89a-90b. Cf. Levine 
(2012: 99-101). Tamari (1987: 94, 1991: 87) argues that Maimonides too believes ona'ah applies not only with respect 
to price but also cost. 
20 Block (2002: 724-725) argues against the interpretation that ona'ah forbids excess profit with respect to costs incurred 
but without citing the Rashbam.
21 Kleiman (1987: 33) further points to the Talmudic laws of interest as they apply to futures contracts, arguing that these 
laws show the Talmud was aware that prices could fluctuate, especially due to supply shocks. Therefore, he says ona'ah 
did not presume “prices fixed by decree. and stable over a long period”, and he rejects the comparison of ona'ah to 
Diocletian's edict of 301 AD. Once again, however, we should remember that Kleiman is concerned with the historical 
meaning of the Talmud, not with ongoing Jewish law as a unity (Kleiman 1987: 25 n. 2).
22 Citing Hil. Mekhirah 14: 1-2, Tur HM 231: 20, SA HM 231: 20, Arukh ha-Shulhan HM 231: 20.
23 In Kleiman's words (1987: 34 n. 19), “It should be also pointed out that had price inspectors been available, much of the 
discussion reported here” concerning the time in which one has to consult with other merchants or one's friends in order 
to discover the proper price “would have been redundant, and an inspector, rather than 'a merchant or … a kinsman,” 
would have been the authority referred to.”
24 Tamari 1987: 149 cites Tosefta BM 11:23 as well. 
25 It is not clear whether Isidore Epstein had ona'ah or corporate-communal price-regulation in mind when he wrote (1962: 
vi) that “Property did not give owners the right to hire workers on their own terms. The wages were fixed with a view to 
safeguarding the workers’ standard of life by the authorities, who drew up regulations as to the wages and hours of 
labour and other rights of the workers.”
26 Aaron Levine adumbrates an interpretation like this (1985a: 423; 1985b: 448), but he does not elaborate or explain, only 
saying laconically that the law of ona'ah is based on the absence of perfect knowledge in the marketplace.
27 Tamari (1991: 89f.) quotes SA HM 227:21 in English at length.
28 I thank Seth Winslow Weissman for personally providing me his paper.
29 Cf. Warhaftig (1987: sec. “A. Preface”): “In short, the danger exists that the manufacturer and the retailer will exploit the 
inexperience and ignorance of the individual consumer, who has neither the time nor the knowledge to adequately 
protect his own interests.” Cf. also Zvi Weiss as quoted in Block (2002: 767f. n. 8).
30 For similar reasons, we should doubt the justice and efficiency of laws against insider-trading; see Manne (1966a, b, 
2002), and McGee and Block (1989).
31 In the “Discussion” (Block and Hexham 1986: 450-461) following Walter Block's criticism (1986) of Meir Tamari 
(1986), Tamari neglected to reply to any of Block's observations concerning ona'ah, speculation, or middlemen. Nor do 
Tamari's later works on the subject (1987, 1991) reply to those works of Block's which Tamari could have seen by the 
time of publication (Block 1986, 1990 but not 2002).
32 Warhaftig argues (1988: sec. “C. Exceptions”) about land and real-estate that “its price depends to a certain extent on its 
location. Hence, there is no standard market price for land.” Elsewhere, Warhaftig (1987: sec. “C. Summation and 
Application”) adds: “One factor relevant to the regulation [under ona'ah] of these products is the fact that often, 
especially in the case of clothing, it is difficult to establish a uniform standard.” But as we shall see shortly, Warhaftig 
himself noted that this is basically true of all goods. Cf. Arukh ha-Shulḥan, ḤM 227:34, quoted in Shilo and Elon (2008), 
which explains that the Talmud exempted certain goods from ona'ah because their valuation is subjective or because 
they have no fixed market price. But the exact same arguments could be made about literally any other good whatsoever. 
However, as Kleiman points out (1987: 39) in the Talmud, subjective “utility was recognized as playing a role in 
determining the prices of individual transactions, and in their departure from the going market price in particular, but not 
in the determination of that price itself.”
33 Peter J. Hill (1995: 376) criticizes Aaron Levine's attempt to apply ona'ah in a modern society, arguing that because of 
modern product differentiation and heterogeneity, “the application of ona’ah, price fraud involving selling above or 
below the competitive norm, is also based on far more information than is easily obtainable in modern society.” Levine's 
reply to Hill (Levine 1995) does not respond to this specific critique by Hill.
34 So only in the absence of a free-market can there be ona'ah. But if the market is not free, why make matters worse by 
further intervention? Would it not make more sense to say that when the market is not free, it should be made free? 
Some economists may object that the government should internalize externalities and provide public goods. But this has 
nothing to do with price-controls contemplated by Warhaftig. Even orthodox welfare economists should be able to agree 
that when the fundamental pricing mechanism is disrupted by government intervention, the solution is less intervention, 
not more.
35 But even though Warhaftig considers ona'ah to be inapplicable in a modern marketplace, he nevertheless concludes that, 
“application of ona'ah laws today requires careful definition of the market price, product standardization including 
packaging, consumer knowledge, and the size of the local market.” It is not clear why we should attempt to implement a 
law that has already been judged inapplicable.
36 The precise figure of 1/6 is also dubious. What is so holy about that fraction? Why not couch the law of price fraud in 
terms of a deviation of one-fifth or one-seventh? Warhaftig (1988: n. 3) attempts an answer, but all of his suggestions are 
somewhat mneumonic or homiletical; none has any real scientific significance. Levine (2012: 109, 112) argues that the 
one-sixth figure made sense once-upon-a-time but not anymore. However, Levine does not explain why the precise 
figure of one-sixth ever made sense in the past. Kleiman (1987: 29-32) argues that the one-sixth margin was meant to 
cover normal variation among prices. However, there is no reason to believe that the normal statistical variance of prices 
from the mean is precisely one-sixth. If ona'ah has any application or relevance today, it should be rewritten to ban 
transactions whose prices are a certain number of standard deviations from the mean, not necessarily ±1∕6.
37 Here, Maimonides appears to be basing ona'ah not on an officially promulgated price, but rather on costs (Tamari 1987: 
94, 1991: 87), similar to the Rashbam's interpretation of ona'ah (Warhaftig 1987, s.v. “5. The Market Price”; Levine 
2012: 99-101).
38 Here, Maimonides seems to return to the conception of ona'ah as relating to an official price and not costs.
39 Citing Talmud, Bava Batra 89a, 90b; Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Mekhirah 14:6; Shulkhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 231:25. 
The citations show that Lew is considering hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh, not ona'ah.
40 Citing Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Mekhirah 14:1-2; Shulkhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 231:28. The citations and the 
reference to “basic goods” show that Tamari is discussing hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh, not ona'ah.
41 Kleiman seems to admit that hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh imposes price-controls, albeit rather opaquely. In his 
words (1987: 29),
Thus, the injunction against overcharging [i.e. ona'ah] did not aim at preventing abnormal profits as 
such. Although, as will be shown later, excessive profits were occasionally exhorted against in the 
Talmud, they are not referred to in the present context of rules regarding overcharging. The 
proscription of the latter [i.e. ona'ah] seems to have been intended only to prevent sharp dealers from 
taking advantage of the customers' lack of information concerning the current market price.
Later, Kleiman notes (1987: 36 n. 23),
The rather general, contrasting statement to the effect that profits (from trade?) should not exceed one-
sixth (TB BB 90a), seems to have represented an attempt to interpret the ona'ah rules in an all-
embracing manner.
Thus, Kleiman appears to brush away any indications that ona'ah was meant as profit-limitation, in order to confirm his 
interpretation that ona'ah is meant only as a protection against ignorance. This allows him to conclude that ona'ah is not 
similar to the Medieval just price legislation after all. Perhaps part of the reason he may do this is because his purpose is 
to analyze Talmudic statements in their individual, isolated historical contexts rather than interpret Jewish law as an 
ongoing, integrated whole (Kleiman 1987: 25 n. 2). 
42 For analysis and critique of price-controls in general, see Coyne and Coyne (2015a), Schuettinger and Butler (1979), 
Morton (2001), Rockoff (2008), and Levine (2012: 94).
43 For the following, cf. Aaron Levine's admirable treatment of the negative effects of price-controls (2012: 93-95).
44 Most modern economies are of course “mixed,” in that some prices are controlled and others are not.
45 For earlier critics of Soviet-style economies, see Bauer and Yamey (1957), Boettke (1993), and Mises ((1975) [1933], 
(1981) [1969]). 
46 Interestingly, the Talmud itself seems to have momentarily realized that price-controls and other such interventions will 
produce unfortunate consequences contrary to their intentions. According to Shmuel Shilo, “The law of overreaching 
[i.e. ona'ah] does not apply to the sale of apparel because the owner would not sell such articles except if he received the 
price he demanded” (Shilo and Elon 2008, citing Talmud, BM 51a). Here the Talmud understands that a price-control or 
otherwise mandated price below market-clearing will produce shortages as otherwise-willing sellers leave the market. If 
the seller wishes to ask a certain price but he is forbidden, then he will be liable to leave the market and withhold his 
product, making buyers as frustrated as himself. What remains to be answered is why the Talmud did not apply this 
same thinking to every other price in the market and thus produce a systematic account of the futility of price-controls 
consistent with modern economic theory. Similarly, according to Warhaftig (1988: sec. “A. Definition”), the Medieval 
Sefer ha-Hinukh “(337) states that it is permissible to charge up to one sixth more than the market price, 'so that the 
necessities of men will be available.'” The Hinukh recognizes that prices must be allowed to deviate up to one-sixth so 
that supply and demand will tend towards equilibrium. So why not allow the price to deviate by more than one-sixth if 
that is what is necessary to bring supply and demand towards equilibrium?
47 Citing Talmud, BB 91a.
48 Citing Talmud, BB 91a and Sh. Ar. ḤM 231:20.
49 Citing Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Mekhira 14:4 and Talmud, BB 90b. See Tamari (1986: 406) and (1987: 92) for nearly 
identical formulations. Likewise Warhaftig (1987: sec. “3”): “This ordinance seems to require every farmer to deliver his 
produce personally to the market.”
50 How ironic that the Talmud would condemn an occupation in which Jews were particularly prominent in the coming 
centuries.
51 Emphasis in original. The source, Sowell (1975: 68f.) is quoted more completely at greater length in Block (1986: 447f. 
n. 19).
52 Sharfman apparently intends ona'ah because he says that “the sixteen percent rule … affects all commodities” (2006: 
192). Therefore, he has to answer with difficulty why the anti-hoarding and anti-speculation measures apply only to 
foodstuffs (2006: 192f.). But as we have shown, ona'ah is not a price-control after all. Instead, we should point to 
hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh, which is a price-control applying to the very same foodstuffs as the anti-hoarding and 
anti-speculation measures in question. In other words, insofar as Sharfman is correct that the queues and shortages 
created by “sixteen percent rule” can be used to justify the Talmud's restrictions on speculation, the relevant “sixteen 
percent rule” is not ona'ah – as Sharfman argues – but rather hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh.
53 Cf. Warhaftig (1988: sec. “E. Ona'ah as an Independent Category”).
54 Citing Talmud BB 90b. The reference to “essential goods” suggests Goldstein is discussing hafka'at she'arim, not 
ona'ah.
55 In the context, Lew is discussing foodstuffs, and his citations suggest the references are to hafka'at she'arim, not ona'ah.
56 Aaron Levine (2012: vii, 15, 28) argues that Judaism's ethics are deontological. But David Hazony (2006) has argued 
that Jewish ethics are concerned more with consequences than with good intentions. According to Hazony (2001: 37f.; 
rpt. Berkovits 2002: xxi), the late philosopher, Rabbi Dr. Eliezer Berkovits “understood [Judaism] to be addressing the 
actual achievement of good, as opposed to one's intentions” and that Judaism, according to Berkovits, is “concerned 
primarily with the bringing about of a just state of affairs, rather than possessing 'just' intentions or adhering to 'just' 
maxims.” But even if we were to concede that Levine is correct that Judaism is generally deontological, contra Hazony, 
this does not appear to be true of the Jewish economic regulations, which appear to intend beneficial consequences, not 
intentions. Moreover, there is reason to doubt whether Levine's claim of Judaism's generally deontological nature is 
consistent with the evidence that Levine himself cited. Levine illustrates Judaism's deontological stance by exploring the 
Jewish laws concerning lying and telling falsehoods. Judaism generally forbids telling any lies (Levine 2012: 15), but 
lying is sometimes permissible when lying will prevent conflict and discord (Levine 2012: 15f., 33f.). Already at this 
point, we should doubt whether Judaism is deontological, for Kant famously held that one must tell the truth even to a 
murderer. The very essence of a deontological ethic is that it has no exceptions, not even when violating the ethic would 
have positive consequences. To permit lying in order to promote peace is somewhat consequentialist. Moreover, Levine 
speaks (2012: 33) of how the prohibition of lying “must be reconciled with” the duty to promote peace. The idea of two 
virtues apparently conflicting until they are reconciled, resembles the eudaimonistic concept of the virtues being 
mutually-determining, with the definition of every virtue being a function of the definitions of every other virtue. 
(Perhaps eudaimonism may be modeled with a system of simultaneous equations?) Therefore, contra Levine, Judaism is 
apparently not deontological because it has consequentialist elements, and Judaism may in fact be eudaimonistic. In 
particular, Berkovits's essay “A Jewish Sexual Ethics” (2002) has an eudaimonistic character; Berkovits argues that 
Judaism outlaws premarital and extramarital sex because Judaism seeks to sanctify the mundane and humanize the 
animalistic; therefore, he says, sex should be engaged in only in the context of a committed, psychologically and 
emotionally intimate relationship. In other words, it appears that human sexuality should be worthy of a rational human 
being and that psychological and emotional intimacy is a necessary component of the “good life”. (By the way, 
according to Shalom Carmy (2004: 203), “the perspicuity of his [Berkovits's] essay on sexual morality has not been 
surpassed.”) But whether Judaism is eudaimonistic or not, it certainly has consequentialist elements, as Hazony argues 
and as a close-reading of Levine demonstrates (contrary to Levine's explicit argument). And the halakhah's economic 
regulations specifically certainly appear to have a strong consequentialist intention, regardless of the nature of the rest of 
Judaism. And insofar as ona'ah is intended for even partially consequentialist reasons, it is vulnerable to positive 
economic arguments about efficiency and - as we shall show shortly - susceptible to Derek Parfit's criticism of “self-
defeating morality.”
57 Elon (2008), citing Talmud, Keritut 8a; Lew (1985: 183), Warhaftig (1987: sec. 7 “Ritual Items”), Tamari (1987: 93, 
1991: 72), and Eliezer Berkovits (2002: 58f.), all citing Talmud, Keritut 1:7.
58 Epstein (1962: v) and Warhaftig (1987: sec. 7 “Ritual Items”), both citing Talmud, Pesahim 30a and Sukkah 34b; Lew 
(1985: 184), citing Pesahim 30a.
59 Thus, if Aaron Levine is correct that Judaism's ethic is deontological, then Talmudic price-controls could never be 
“substantively self-defeating” in Parfit's sense, but only “formally self-defeating.” But we showed that contra Levine, 
Judaism is somewhat consequentialist and perhaps eudaimonistic. Both consequentialistic and eudaimonistic systems are 
vulnerable to Parfit's criticism of “self-defeating” morality.
60 Concerning ona'ah, Levine adumbrates (1985a: 423; 1985b: 448) an interpretation like the one we have discussed, that 
ona'ah is only meant to promote the dissemination of information, but he does not elaborate or explain.
61 The same statement occurs verbatim twice.
62 The same statement occurs verbatim twice.
63 The same statement occurs verbatim twice.
64 The same difficulty exists in this statement by Meir Tamari (1987: 95): “the seller is bound by these fixed prices as long 
as they are operative. Should prices rise … the seller is free to charge whatever he wishes...”. And likewise, this 
statement by Warhaftig (1987: end of sec. “4. Profit Limitation”): “The law applies only if the present market price is 
unchanged. If the price has risen, he may sell at the prevailing price even though he will thereby profit more than a 
sixth.”
65 Meanwhile, Tamari and Warhaftig would say that once the market price rises beyond $10, sellers may sell for whatever 
price they want (see previous note).
66 The same identical passage occurs on both pp. 109 and 112.
67 Cf. Levine 1985a: 423: “the constraint amounts to nothing more than a restraint on economic rent” and Levine 1985b: 
448: “what it amounts to is really a restraint on economic rent.”
68 For a criticism of the Neoclassical static-equilibrium theory of monopoly, see Leoni (2009 [1965]). That it would be 
impossible to rationally rate-regulate a monopoly due to the Misesian impossibility of economic calculation under 
socialism, see Cornell and Webbink (1985: 44 n. 16). And according to Israel Kirzner's theory of the market as a 
“process” (following Mises), the dynamic market process is itself the solution to so-called market failures, including 
monopoly and excess profits (Kirzner 1997, Littlechild 2009 [1978], DiLorenzo 1988: 321f., Pasour 1987: 124-126). 
Furthermore, monopoly is typically a consequence of government regulation and intervention, not the operation of the 
free-market (Hayek [2007] 1944 ch. 4 [“The Inevitability of Planning”]; McGee 1958; Kolko 1963: ch. 1-2; Leoni 2009 
[1965]; Stigler 1971; Posner 1974; Folsom 2010 [1987]; Armentano [1972, 1982, 1991], Boudreaux and DiLorenzo 
[1992], DiLorenzo [1997]). Therefore, Levine should have said that the modern equivalent of hafka'at she'arim is not to 
tax the excess profits of a monopolist, but rather to repeal the government intervention which creates the monopoly. If 
monopolies are actually a consequence of government intervention, then it would make more sense to interpret hafka'at 
she'arim instead as a ban on rent-seeking (Tullock 1967, Krueger 1974) and government regulations which insulate 
corporations from competition (Stigler 1971, Posner 1974), allowing them to earn monopoly rents. That above-normal 
returns to entrepreneurship are sometimes wrongfully diagnosed as monopoly rents obtained through rent-seeking, see 
DiLorenzo (1988: 321f.) and Pasour (1987: 124-126); cf. Ricketts (1987).
69 Otzar ha-Geonim, Gittin 68, par. 376, quoted in Levi (2006 [1983]: 223); quoted in slightly different translation in 
Student (2001). Interestingly, Slifkin (2006) does not deal at all with the issue of Talmudic law conflicting with science; 
all of his cases concern rather contradictions between the Biblical text and science.
70 Quoted in Levi (2006 [1983]: 223f.) and in Hirsch (n.d.: 21); cited in Angel (2008: 16).
71 Moreh Nevukhim, pt. 3, end of ch. 14, quoted in Levi (2006 [1983]: 223); quoted in slightly different translation in 
Student (2001).
72 This essay by Rabbi Avraham ben ha-Rambam is most famous for expressing the opinion that the aggadot (philosophy 
and theology expressed through homilies) of the Talmud are not necessarily to be taken literally, but that many were 
intended by the Talmud only allegorically. Furthermore, that the aggadot are not dogmas, and that the religious Jew has 
no obligation to believe any of the aggadot – whether literally or allegorically – and that one may simply reject their 
authority altogether. Dana Cohen (n.d.) has compiled an English-translation primary source reader for Medieval-era 
expressions of this opinion. Important modern expressions of this view include Samson Raphael Hirsch (n.d.), Marc D. 
Angel (2008: 19-22, 1990: 22-26), Chaim Eisen (2004), Leo Jung (1926, quoted in Shapiro 2009) citing David Zvi 
Hoffman, J. H. Hertz (1934, quoted in Shapiro 2009), and Shelomoh Danziger (1996b: 62) quoting Rabbis Sherira and 
Hai Gaon. 
73 Levi (2006 [1983]: 225) freely translating Breuer (1975); transl. slightly differently in Hirsch (n.d.: 19).
74 One prominent advocate of the “closed Talmud” argument was Rabbi Moshe Shmuel Glasner, the Dor Revi'i, whose 
view (1921) is cited by Schachter (2014: 50). Gil Student (2001) illustrates the same “closed Talmud” view by instead 
citing Yad Yehuda (30:3) following Maimonides, Hilkhot Shekhitah 10:12-13. In fact, Glasner too was following the very 
same view of Maimonides. The subject under discussion was what to do when the laws of tereifot, unkosher meat, 
appear to contradict veterinary science. According to the laws of tereifot, an animal possessing a fatal wound is not 
kosher for human consumption. However, certain wounds which the Talmud declared to be fatal, were later decided to 
not be fatal at all. The answer of Maimonides was that the Talmud is sealed and that those wounds enumerated by the 
Talmud make an animal legally unkosher even if the contrary scientific opinion of contemporary veterinarians is correct 
after all. Schachter (2014: 50) says “I don't think this approach makes sense. Wrong is wrong!”, and he advocates 
changing the halakhah if it is based on erroneous science.
75 Concerning the very same issue of tereifot and veterinary science (mentioned in the previous note), the Rashba and 
Rivash declared that contemporary science was not reliable, and that the Talmud should be trusted above all (Student 
2001, Buchman 2007). Glasner (1921) cites Rashba and declares that he wishes for us to deny the reality that is before 
our very eyes, that science is indeed reliable. This dispute between Maimonides on the one hand and Rashba and Rivash 
on the other, concerning the contradiction between the Talmudic laws of tereifot (fatal wounds) and contemporary 
veterinary science, is covered at length in Buchman (2007). As Buchman points out (2007: 132 n. 42) , a large part of 
their disagreement can be explained by a dispute over just which specific laws were given explicitly at Sinai and which 
were instead deduced by the Rabbis of the Talmud from general Sinaitic principles:
In general, the attitude of Rivash and Rashba [that where the Talmud and veterinary science contradict, 
the latter is mistaken and the Talmud should be trusted above all] is related to the belief that the 
mesora [receipt of revelation] from Sinai was very detailed. The Rambam [Maimonides]’s position, 
that all issues on which there is disagreement [amongst authorities within the Talmud itself] are not 
part of the mesorah from Sinai, makes quite clear his belief that the original mesorah was not that 
detailed and much was left to the Rabbis to decide. … Rambam … belie[ved] that the bulk of the 
details of Torah law were deduced by the Rabbis and not part of the mesora from Sinai.
Gil Student (2014) has recently reviewed a new book which advocates the view that science is not reliable or 
trustworthy. Reviewing Torah, Chazal and Science by Moshe Meiselman, Student (2014) notes that Meiselman is forced 
to reject many traditional Orthodox Jewish opinions, even going so far as to doubt the authenticity of the letter by Rabbi 
Avraham ben ha-Rambam, a move which Student demonstrates is questionable (2014: 52).
76 Hershel Schachter (2014: 50) cites two examples of this, the laws of consuming worms found in fish and killing lice on 
Shabbat. He argues that these two laws preexisted the outmoded scientific notions of spontaneous generation by which 
the Talmud justified them.
77 Square-bracketed [] text is in the original. 
78 Student (2014) provides an interesting illustration of Schachter's caution. Reviewing New Heavens and a New Earth: 
The Jewish Reception of Copernican Thought by Jeremy Brown, Student (2014) shows that some rabbis rejected 
Copernican cosmology not because they believed that science could never be wrong or that science could never trump 
the Talmud, but rather because they were skeptical of the specific theory of Copernicus's, on scientific, not theological 
grounds. For example, Student says, Rabbi David Gans rejected Copernican theory because he studied under one of 
Copernicus's contemporaries, Tycho Brahe. Meanwhile, Rabbi Yosef Delmedigo sided with Copernicus after studying 
under Galileo. But another rabbi who studied under Galileo, Tuviah Cohen, rejected the Copernican revolution. The 
point is that not every rabbi or Orthodox Jew who rejects the findings of modern science necessarily does so for 
theological reasons; sometimes one may disagree with scientists on scientific grounds. Those rabbis who were roughly 
Copernicus's contemporaries, could without embarrassment endorse those astronomers, contemporaries of Copernicus, 
who rejected the Copernican revolution on scientific, not theological grounds. Student (2014: 55 n. 29) notes that when 
Rabbi Yehuda Levi rejects evolution, he “explicitly states that this is for scientific and not religious reasons.” 
79 Square-bracketed [] text is in the original, while curly-bracketed {} text is added by the present author.
80 For example, Germany implemented its policy of Lebensraum, acquiring “living space” by conquest, because its policy 
of autarky, economic self-sufficiency, dictated that Germany must possess all necessary natural resources within its own 
borders, precluding the possibility of importing foreign goods. As the Manchester economists noted, “where goods do 
not cross borders, armies will.”
